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Mortgage Market Techniques and Characteristics
THE techniques, characteristics, and institutional arrangements that have
distinguished the postwar mortgage market from other sectors of the
capital market are described and appraised in this chapter. Emphasis is
placed on innovations in mortgage market techniques and arrangements
and modifications of older ones that have been particularly characteristic
of postwar years. As in the preceding chapter, a large part of what follows
is based on information obtained in interviews, with executives of financial
institutions.
Changes in mortgage markets, it will be recalled, are a part of funda-
mental. changes in postwar financial and economic conditions. The in-
creasing institutionalization of saving and investment—a trend initiated
decades earlier—has resulted in new techniques for efficiently channeling
funds into mortgage markets and, in some instances, for assuring the
continuous investment of funds for months (and sometimes years) ahead.
Federal monetary and fiscal policies and the consequent alternate periods
of capital market ease and tightness have also contributed to the develop-
ment of those techniques to support the flow of funds into mortgage mar-
kets.The continuing trend towards a nationwide mortgage market,
accelerated by federally underwritten mortgage programs, has led to
increasing secondary market transactions and to a unique relationship
between primary and secondary market activities. The growth of the
construction industry and the increasing importance of the large-scale
builder have created new needs for large-scale short-term financing.
Meeting those needs by financial institutions has led to a closer relation-
ship between interim, construction, and permanent mortgage financing.
Finally, the accelerated rate of real estate turnover at increasingly high
prices in the postwar period has brought about a renewal of activity in
junior mortgages—the "purchase-money" variety rather than the newly
originated variety.
Time Lags in Mortgage Lending
A and inherent characteristic of mortgage and construction markets
is the time lag between a firm decision to invest in mortgages and in their
acquisition. Lags are generally greater and timing much more uncertain
than in other segments of the capital market.' They are longest and most
1Oneindication of this was given in Chapter 4 where the lagging movement of mortgage
interest rates was shown. The problems of investment planning faced by mortgage lenders
of the uncertainty of time lags were discussed in Chapter 6.
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uncertain in financing new construction, but transactions in existing real
estate are also subject to significant delays between firm commitment and
closing.Financing of both new and existing properties under VA and
FHA mortgage guarantee and insurance takes longer to complete (paper
work necessary to meet federal requirements) than comparable financing
through conventional mortgages.Because of the uncertain time lags
encountered in acquiring uncompleted mortgages through advance com-
mitments, some nationwide lenders unable to judge their cash flows accu-
rately have found it more satisfactory to acquire completed mortgages in
secondary markets for immediate delivery.
As the share of postwar mortgage flows accounted for by new con-
struction activity, federally-aided financing, and advance commitments
has grown, the time lags between decisions to invest and actual flows of
mortgage funds have lengthened. This means that a large share of current
mortgage flows at any time stems from investment decisions made several
months earlier. The flow of funds into the mortgage market, therefore,
may be large and rising at a time when new commitments and funds
available for financing proposed construction and real estate transactions
are scarce. Conversely, new commitments may be plentiful while the flow
of funds into the market is reduced. Which situation arises depends on the
capital market environment. This basic characteristic of postwar mort-
gage finance has important implications alike for general monetary policy,
for specific financial policy of institutional investors, and for accurate
appraisal of mortgage statistics.The consequences of time lags add a
further problem to the prevailing complexities of market analysis.
Relationship between Construction, Interim, and
Permanent Mortgage Financing
Short-term as well as long-term credits are an integral part of mortgage
market operations. The role of each type of credit and the relationships
between them, unique in this sector of the capital market, is one of the
more interesting aspects of mortgage market organization and technique.
Short-term credits in real estate finance are extended for two general
purposes, to provide funds for the construction process and to meet the
interim financing needs of mortgage loan originators.2 Funds for con-
struction financing are supplied chiefly by commercial banks and savings
and loan associations.The banks make principally temporary loans
pending completion and sale of the property. The associations make their
2Otherpurposes and types of interim financing, generally called warehousing, are
discussed in detail in a later section on interim financing techniques.
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loans as a basis for acquiring permanent mortgages.3 Loans for interim
real estate financing are made to mortgage lenders almost exclusively by
commercial banks.
Before the rapid postwar growth of large scale residential developers
and mortgage companies, construction and interim financing were fairly
simple, uncomplicated operations. Construction was undertaken largely
on contract for home owners and the financing was arranged either directly
by the owner or by the builder for the owner. There was no doubt about
the identity of the ultimate owner or mortgagee. Financing of both con-
and sale of the property was generally handled by one lender in
one transaction with one instrument.
After the war, the increasing importance of large-scale housing develop-
ments calling for large amounts of construction funds, and the concurrent
growth of mortgage companies, often requiring continuing lines of com-
mercial bank credit to finance mortgages carried for ultimate investors,
brought important changes. The processes of construction, interim, and
permanent mortgage financing, and relationships between them gave a
new facet to the mortgage market.Construction financing became a
specialized, separate lending operation with techniques of its own, heavily
dependent upon short-term lenders.Its flow to builders is closely related
to the availability of permanent mortgage financing and often to interim
financing.
It is the unique characteristic of the process that before short-term funds
can he obtained for construction, long-term permanent mortgage financing
must usually be arranged for the ultimate sale of the completed construc-
tion.This is almost invariably true in residential construction for sale.
Producers of residential property for sale, therefore, unlike producers of
durable goods, are concerned directly with arrangements for the
permanent mortgage financing of their completed properties.If such
financing is assured, it smoothes the way not only for obtaining con-
struction funds but also for selling completed houses. Thus, prospective
buyers of newly completed houses often find that financing has already
been. arranged for them.In the secondhand house market where the.
seller is not the producer this is less often true, although it is not uncommon
for prearranged favorable financing terms to be offered as an inducement
to buyers.
Dc spite the interdependent relationship between construction and per-
manent financing, the suppliers of each type of credit operate in financial
Fri an important proportion of cases, however, as shown in Chapter 6, construction
financing by savings and loan associations has not led to permanent løans.
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markets with different characteristics. The disparity can lead to lack of
short-term construction financing even when permanent take-out commit-
ments have been negotiated.Such a situation usually occurs during
periods of heavy demands for short-term commercial bank credit.
1)uring the spring of 1956, for example, when business loans were high and
rising and bank reserves low, commercial banks were turning down
construction loans, not because permanent financing was not available,
but because of inadequate funds. During such periods, customer relations
become a paramount factor, and builders having long-established
banking relationships are the first to be served.
Because of the basic variations that developed in the nature and pur-
poses of interim financing ("warehousing") in the latter part of the first
postwar decade, and because of the widespread attention given to it, a later
section is devoted to the subject. At this point it is pertinent only to indi-
cate the general relationship of interim financing to construction and
permanent financing. The relationship is, in fact, quite simple.
Interim financing serves generally to bridge the gap from the time con-
struction is completed and the property sold, and the construction loan
has to be repaid, to the time when the permanent mortgage papers are
completed and ready for delivery to the ultimate investor. As indicated,
interim financing has become more integrated into the mortgage financing
process with the increasingly important role played by mortgage companies
in the postwar decade as originators of mortgages for ultimate long-term
investors. These companies rely heavily on short-term commercial bank
credit to finance their operations, especially the holding of inventories for
the interval described (see Chapter 8).Interim financing has become
more important, also, as the needs of large-scale permanent mortgage
investors have changed, and mortgage commitment techniques have
acquired new aspects. Mortgage commitments were discussed in Chapter
6 in connection with the policies and problems of life insurance companies
and mutual savings banks.The basic importance of the mortgage
commitment process, however, from the standpoint of market technique
and operation makes its discussion in somewhat more detail here both
instructive and essential.
Mortgage Commitment Techniques
The mortgage commitment represents, in effect, a promise to provide
mortgage credit in the future under specified terms and conditions. In
principle it is not unlike any other financial commitment given by a lender
to a prospective borrower. In actual practice, commitments have become
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an integral part of most mortgage transactions and one of the distinguish-
ing characteristics of mortgage market operations. The only other segment
of the capital market in which commitments play a significant role is that
characterized by direct placement of corporate securities. In the markets
for government obligations and for a part of the market for corporate
securities (particularly that of railroad and public utility issues), character-
ized in the main by open market offerings and competitive bidding rather
than direct negotiation, commitments have no part in market transactions.
One interesting difference between commitments in the corporate
Securities market and in the mortgage market is worth noting.In the
former market, negotiations involve two parties—the financial institution
and t:he corporate borrower. In the latter, where commitments to finance
the permanent mortgage on new construction are under negotiation, three
parties are involved—the financial institution, the builder, and the ulti-
mate mortgage borrower, upon whose acceptance by the financial insti-
tution depends the ultimate disbursement of funds.Commitments to
supply mortgage funds to finance purchase of existing properties also often
involve three parties—the financial institution, the seller, and the pur-
chaser.
innovations in mortgage commitment techniques, it will be
recal].ed, have been developed in response to the needs of large-scale inves-
tors and to changes in capital market conditions. Two such innovations
stand. out, both used in connection with the financing of new residential
construction. The "forward commitment," in which arrangements are
made as far in advance as two years for investment of funds in mortgages
to be created, was discussed in connection with lending policies and prob-
lems of financial institutions (Chapter 6).This commitment variation
was developed by—and so far has been limited largely to—a few large life
insurance companies that have found it well suited to the fundamental
nature of their business and their long-range investment needs. The likeli-
hood is that the forward commitment will continue in limited use by inves-
tors able to guage future income flows accurately and finding it expedient
to acquire mortgages on a regular basis through a well-established per-
manent investing organization.
The second postwar innovation of an altogether different sort is the
so-called standby commitment. It reflects both the indispensability to the
construction process of an arrangement for permanent financing, and the
ingenuity of the mortgage industry in adapting to market conditions at
when the supply of long-term mortgage funds becomes severely
limited. As the name suggests, a standby commitment is one given by an
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institutional investor to a mortgage originator or a builder in which the in-
vestor pledges to purchase mortgages at a price below the prevailing market
price and below the price expected to prevail when the construction is com-
pleted and the mortgage is ready for delivery. The investor, therefore, does
not expect to be called upon to fulfill this type of commitment, which he
gives principally in consideration of the nonrefundable fee received. The
builder or mortgage originator is willing to pay the fee because the standby
makes possible arrangements for construction financing upon which
commencing the building operation depends.
The standby commitment is usually given for a period of from six to
twelve months at a fee that varies directly with the mortgage price. The
more the standby commitment underquotes the prevailing market price,
the lower the fee charged. Thus, in the spring of 1956, commitments to
purchase FHA or VA mortgages at 90 per cent of par were obtainable at a
cost ofof 1 per cent, while at 93 per cent of par commitments carried
a fee of 1 per cent. Mortgage prices associated with fees vary with changes
in the current market price for completed mortgages.
The origin of the standby commitment is not completely clear, but at
least one claim for its invention has been made by a large New York mort-
gage brokerage house.It is said that the first standby was given in the
summer of 1950 when permanent take-out commitments were difficult to
arrange in the booming construction market of that year.4 However, it
was not until the periods of extreme mortgage tightness in 1952—1953 and
1955—1956 that the standby device came into wide use with variations
depending upon the institutional investor involved. Large commercial
banks, one important source of standbys, have made them often in con-
junction with short-term credits extended for construction or interim
financing. Thus, a bank may make a construction loan backed by its own
standby commitment to purchase the completed mortgage, and accom-
panied by an agreement to provide interim financing (warehousing) for a
short period. This is a convenient arrangement for the mortgage origi-
nator, who has a given length of time to locate a more favorable market for
the completed permanent mortgage. For each of these separate services
(construction financing, standby commitment, interim financing), the
bank earns separate fees as well as interest.
To a lesser extent than commercial banks, long-term institutional inves-
tors also provide standby commitments. Their reason is not only to earn
the fees, but also the hope of obtaining mortgages for their portfolios at
"Pringle—Hurdand Company, Inc., Mortgage Market News and Comment, September 20,
1954, p. 8.
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bargain prices.Savings and loan associations, savings banks, and life
insurance companies each sometimes combine standby commitments with
options to purchase the mortgages under the commitment at more realistic
market prices (i.e., prices higher than stipulated in the commitments)
when ready for delivery. If their operations permit and the mortgages are
satisfactory, these institutions have thus created an additional source of
mortgages for their portfolios.
Without doubt, the standby commitment technique has proved advan-
tageous to each of the participants, when, as anticipated, markets ease at
the end of the standby period and completed mortgages are sold to per-
manent investors. The builder has been enabled to proceed with con-
struct ion, the mortgage originator has maintained or increased his volume
of and the institutional investor has earned a profitable fee for a
promise to lend in case of need. If, however, the mortgage market tightens
further during the standby period and mortgage prices decline, the standby
price may become the market price, with the result that the institutional
is pledged to unintended mortgage acquisition and the builder has
paid substantially higher financing costs than he intended.While the
standby committer prepared for such an eventuality may not be unhappy
to have acquired mortgages at very favorable prices, the unprepared
institutio.n may be embarrassed by a lack of ready funds to honor such
commitments. Many small savings and loan associations found themselves
in a difficult situation in late 1955, for example, when they were un-
expectedly called upon to honor standbys at a time when the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board had restricted borrowings from the Federal Home
Loan Banks. Some of them resorted to commercial bank credit to meet
their commitments. Some large commercial banks, on the other hand, that
had acquired mortgages unexpectedly when the market price fell below
the standby price, were able to absorb these mortgages and sell them
later at more favorable prices.
The effects of the standby commitment technique on market processes,
as on individual participants, are also mixed. One favorable effect is felt
during periods of temporary credit stringency in the capital market when
standbys may serve the useful function of moderating declines in the avail-
abilii:y of mortgage funds and, hence, in the volume of residential con-
struction. Moreover, the standby technique permits the creation of a pool
of completed mortgages ready for immediate delivery, an advantage to
some types of institutional investors unable or unwilling to commit them-
selves months in advance to acquire mortgages.
Art unfavorable effect lies in the destabilizing potential of the standby
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commitment to the mortgage market. Use of this technique makes possible
an expansion in construction activity to a level that may not be sustain-
able, and a volume of mortgages that cannot be readily absorbed by long-
term investors. Such a situation can readily result from pressure of builders
for construction financing and from misjudgment on the part of standby
committers of the time span of the credit stringency. There is evidence
that, during part of 1955 and 1956, a volume of residential construction
was undertaken larger than financial intermediaries could comfortably
finance through the capital market, considering the strong demands for
credit from business, consumers, and governments. Mortgage offerings
exceeded takings, prices were depressed, and increasing use was made of
short-term commercial bank credit to finance temporarily the excess
volume of mortgages.
Interim Financing Developments
The use of short-term commercial bank credit by mortgage originators to
finance their interim needs between the payment of loan proceeds to
borrowers and the delivery of completed mortgages to ultimate investors
has long been an integral part of the real estate financing process.In-
creased demands for this type of credit during the postwar decade are
traceable to the standardization of mortgage contracts, resulting from the
introduction of federal mortgage insurance and guarantee, and the
lowering of legal barriers to out-of-state mortgage investments. The in-
creased ability and willingness of institutional investors, with large aggre-
gations of savings, to purchase mortgages on a nationwide basis has been
accompanied by the rapid establishment and growth of mortgage com-
panies originating and servicing loans for such mortgagees. These com-
panies, characterized by limited capital in comparison with the volume of
t.heir operations, depend heavily on commercial bank credit.5 Moreover,
changing needs of institutional investors and periodic stringency in the
market for long-term financing have further increased the use of commer-
cial bank credits and led to numerous variations in techniques and
arrangements, collectively called "mortgage warehousing."
VARIATIONS IN TECHNIQUE
Some of the arrangements for interim mortgage financing apply to mort-
gages already in existence, others to mortgages not yet made. Some
variations concern mortgages on uncompleted houses, others, mortgages
on existing properties. Some have two parties at interest, and others three
See Chapter 8.
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or more. Some arrangements include the pledge of specific mortgages as
collateral, others general credit lines, and still others the purchase of mort-
gages under specified repurchase agreements. Some call for the use of
bank credit for very short periods, others for considerably longer periods.
Some are backed by commitments of permanent investors, others not.
Most transactions deal with federally underwritten mortgages, but some
with conventional mortgages. Some borrowers are builders, others mort-
gage originators, and still others mortgage investors. In all of these varia-
tions, the division of rights, interests, and obligations of the parties to the
transaction are finely drawn and often legally complex. The one charac-
teristic and purpose that is common to virtually all warehousing trans-
actions is the use of commercial bank credit for an interim period pending
the availability of long-term funds or the fulfillment of prearranged
conditions.
The use of the term "warehousing" to describe fundamentally different
types of interim financing transactions designed to achieve different pur-
poses has led to considerable confusion and misunderstanding., Equally
confusing have been the numerous terms that have sprung up in the trade
to describe essentially the same kinds of transactions.It is difficult to
distinguish favorite terms for identical transactions from bona fide terms to
variations in technique. Among the more commonly used terms
encountered in market interviews are the following:"committed" or
"closed-end" warehousing; "uncommitted" or "open-end" warehousing;
"warehouse with a standby";"institutional" or "repurchase" ware-
housing; "clearing" loans, "inventory" loans, and "ordinary collateral"
loans.. The list could undoubtedly be lengthened. Among all the technical
variations of interim financing, four types could be distinguished, each
having meaningful characteristics with respect to participants, rights and
obligations, fees and charges, risk, and purpose of borrowing. They are:
(1) committed short-term loans;(2) committed long-term loans;(3) Un-
committed loans (possibly including those under standby); and (4) insti-
tutional committed loans, or repurchase agreements.6
The classification suggested here differs somewhat from those in the sources below,
but the differences are readily detectable and should not be confusing. The only published
classifications found were in Mortgage Credit and FHA Mull ffamily Housing, Report No. 2 of
the Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of
Representatives, January 31, 1956, pp. 8—13; and in data reported by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in tables on "Credit Extended to Real Estate
Mortgage Lenders by Weekly Reporting Member Banks in Leading Cities," published in
various issues of the Bullegin, for example, September 1956, p. 1,347. The two classifi-
cations differ chiefly in that the former does not distinguish between loans secured and
unsecured by mortgages, and the latter does not distinguish between loans backed or
not backed by take-out commitments. Further, in Mortgage Gredit the description of
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The first and still most common type of interim financing, basic to
mortgage company operations for years, involves the use of short-term
commercial bank credits for periods of from 60 to 180 days. These credits
are secured by permanent mortgages awaiting final processing an.d legal
documentation, or by temporary loans on construction awaiting completion
—both backed by firm take-out commitments of institutional investors.
In many long-standing relationships between mortgage companies and
commercial banks, a revolving line of credit is provided rather than in-
dividual credits for each transaction. When the documents are completed
by the mortgage company and delivered to the permanent investor, the
company uses the proceeds received to discharge its obligation to the bank.
This type of loan is considered by most commercial bankers as an ordinary
collateral loan made to finance a customer's sold inventory. The volume
of such loans has multiplied in the postwar decade, as mortgage company
operations have expanded.
The development of the long-term forward commitment by institutional
investors gave rise to the need for longer-term financing of mortgage
correspondents by commercial banks—a second form of warehousing.
In the newer arrangement—as in the older one—loans are secu:red by
mortgages and by firm take-out commitments of ultimate investors. On the
surface, the oniy difference between the short-term and long-term interim
financing techniques is the loan maturity. There is, however, a funda-
mental difference in purpose and in the obligations and rights of partici-
pants. In the short-term type the bank is performing a typical financing
service for a borrower short of funds pending technical readying of an
inventory of goods that will be taken and paid for immediately by the
purchaser that ordered it.In the longer-term type, the inventory of loans
is ready for delivery but the investor is not ready to accept it according to
his planned investment schedule. In this instance, warehousing seems an
apt term for a credit operation that supports storage of completed mort-
gages in a convenient reservoir for later tapping by an ultimate investor
as funds become available. Some commercial banks regard this type of
arrangement as a credit to finance a deferred purchase.
Another distinct characteristic of the second type of interim financing is
"uncommitted-line warehousing" encompasses standby commitments discussed separately
here. The Federal Reserve classification, finally, does not include all the basic market
variations discussed here, primarily because of problems of data collection.
The classification distinguishes between committed and uncommitted warehousing,
but does not use the latter as synonymous with standby commitments. Discussions with
participants in the market seemed to justify that separation, although a few institutional
investors were found to regard the standby commitment as a form of uncommitted
warehousing, and some used both together.
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the usually unconditional commitment of the ultimate investor to purchase
mortgages. Before the warehousing transaction is negotiated, the com-
pleted mortgages are subject to inspection by the investor and must have
approval with respect to legal documentation, property specifications, and
mortgagor qualifications. The investor agrees to purchase the mortgages
at the appointed date, whether or not they go into default or delinquency
during the warehousing period. In some instances, the agreement even
requires the investor to take out of warehouse mortgages that have been in
default for at least 90 days. During the warehousing period, amortization
payments on pledged mortgages are remitted to the interim lender. The
mortgages are generally recorded in the name of the ultimate investor,
who may also hold the mortgages in his possession. If so, the interim lender
holds a trust receipt. Technical arrangements vary in numerous ways.7
A third type of warehousing is similar to the first in purpose and duration
except that it is not backed by a firm take-out commitment of an insti-
tutional investor. These uncommitted or open-end loans (distinguished
from committed or closed-end loans of the second type) are often made to
the larger, more heavily capitalized mortgage originators in a position to
extend mortgage credit without prior commitments from an ultimate
investor. These originators rely on their knowledge of the mortgage mar-
ket and contacts within it to sell completed loans for immediate delivery.
Often, in making uncommitted warehousing loans, the commercial bank
also gives a standby commitment to the mortgage company or builder—a
transaction known in the trade as a "warehouse with a standby." Through
it, the originator unable to find a permanent investor at the end of the
warehousing period may, as a last resort, fall back on the bank's standby
commitment to buy the mortgage. Some observers have regarded the
uncommitted warehousing loan as synonymous with the standby commit-
ment.8Sufficient evidence (uncommitted warehousing loans made by
commercial banks without standbys or backed by standby commitments
of other lenders) was found in this study, however, to justify regarding the
two techniques as separate and distinct, albeit closely related.
Commercial bank interim financing loans backed by standby commit-
ments of other financial institutions are regarded as more risky than loans
backcd by regular take-out commitments. Most commercial banks regard
I am grateful to William F. Keesler and King Upton, vice presidents of the First
National Bank of Boston, and to Raymond T. O'Keefe, vice president of the Chase
Manhattan Bank of New York, for providing much of the technical information under-
lying the discussion of the second type of interim financing.
See Report No. 2 of the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on
Banki3g and Currency, pp. 8—10.
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standbys as not so firm as regular commitments. Usually the regular take-
out lender is interested in acquiring the loan, but the main purpose of the
standby lender is often to earn a fee for a promise to lend. When unexpec-
ted market declines have occurred, standby committers have often been
caught short. At best, they have requested delays in delivery of closed
loans, and at worst, have tried to back out of the commitment through
technical loopholes. Many commercial bankers have, therefore, classified
interim loans backed by standbys in the same category as uncommitted
short-term loans.
An officer of a large commercial bank, active in interim mortgage finan-
cing, has indicated the following criteria as in general use by commercial
banks for granting uncommitted lines of credit to mortgage originators:
1. Ability of mortgage company to sell mortgages under adverse market
circumstances
2. Diversification of borrower's sales outlets and reputation as servicer
of mortgages
3. Ratio of borrower's unsold mortgages to total capital; to its service
account, excluding FNMA account; and to anticipated annual sales
4. Quality of unsold loans, possible market for them, and how well they
meet usual requirements of borrower's previous investors
5. Lender's appraisal of the availability of long-term funds for mortgage
investment9
A fourth—and last in the present classification—variation in interim
mortgage financing is the "repurchase" or "institutional warehousing"
arrangement. The transaction is between a commercial bank and a per-
manent mortgage investor; the bank extends regular short-term credits
secured by mortgage loans or purchases the mortgage loans under a repur-
chase agreement. This arrangement, which first appeared early in 1955,
received wide publicity, partly because of the large size of single trans-
actions, and partly because of implications for public policy.
Because of the large sums usually involved in such loans, many banks
ordinarily participate in one transaction under the management of
the bank negotiating the loan.10 This type of loan has been used by
King Upton (vice president, First National Bank of Boston), unpublished address,
"Interim Financing of Closed Loans and Long-term Forward Commitments," at meeting
of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, February 23, 1956.
10Inthe warehousing transaction between Prudential Life Insurance Company and
Irving Trust Company in 1955—perhaps the largest of that type—a loan under repurchase
agreement of some $350 million was arranged in which 150 banks participated.In the
arrangement between Institutional Securities Corporation, acting for several New York
mutual savings banks, and Chase Manhattan Bank a loan for $250 million was negotiated
divided among several commercial banks. Apparently less than 10 per cent of the large
reservoir of funds was actually used by the borrowers.
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institutional investors to serve one of two purposes: relief for an overcom-
mitted position, or establishment of a reservoir of mortgage funds.In the
first instance, an institution overly zealous in committing itself to acquire
mortgages during a period of easy money may be left with insufficient funds
to continue both a current mortgage investment program and to acquire
mortgages committed for during an earlier period.Rather than sell
government securities—perhaps in an unfavorable market—or reduce
heavily its current mortgage investment program, the financial institution
may prefer a warehousing arrangement. In the second, an institution
temporarily lacking funds to acquire a feasible and desirable number of
mortgages in a current period seeks to establish credit for that purpose
until its own situation is eased. The longer-term aspects of this type of
financing as well as the major purpose of establishing a pool of mortgages
make it similar to interim financing under long-term forward commit-
ments. discussed earlier.
Whether or not institutional warehousing arrangements provide for
repurchase within a specified time or for repayment of a regular mortgage
collateral loan has little real economic significance. It is generally a matter
of legal technicality or convenience. Because of legal limitations on the
amount a bank may lend to one customer, large transactions usually are
made in the form of repurchase arrangements. For example, in the trans-
action between Chase Manhattan Bank and Institutional Securities Cor-
poration (footnote 10) the bank agreed to make a straight collateral loan
for $50 million and to purchase under repurchase agreement $200 million
of mortgages. On the borrower side, a large insurance company, for
example, may not care to have its financial statement show heavy bank
borrowings and hence may prefer the repurchase form ofagreement. Thus,
the transaction between Prudential Insurance Company and Irving Trust
Company (footnote 10) was entirely under repurchase arrangement, but
it is unlikely that the mortgages were ever physically removed to the bank's
vaults.
While the distinction between a loan and a repurchase arrangement may
have :.ittle economic meaning, there is an important statistical distinction
in the classification of commercial bank loans. Mortgage loans acquired
by a bank un. der repurchase agreement are properly classified as real estate
loans in reports of condition. Mortgages taken as collateral for a loan,
however, must be classified as commercial loans. Undoubtedly, the large
increase in the volume of warehousing transactions under repurchase
agreement in 1955 resulted in a reported increase in the volume ofcommer-
cial bank real estate credit loans outstanding.
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Each of the four types of interim financing discussed above is an indi-
vidually negotiated transaction between lender and borrower." Each is,
therefore, subject to variations in interest rate charges and other fees which
are difficult to determine.
There is less semblance of an organized market for interim financing
than for other areas of mortgage finance, and thus there is little standardi-
zation of terms. For loans in which there is little risk to commercial banks
(types 1, 2, and 4), the interest rate seems generally to be 0.5 per cent
above the prime loan rate with no additional loan fees or charges. Through
most of 1955 the best interim loans were made atper cent. In early
1956, the rate had risen to 4 per cent and, as the prime loan rate advanced,
continued upward toper cent by the autumn of 1956. On institutional
loans that are managed by one bank for a syndicate, the managing bank
usually receives a small fee for its services.'2 On smaller warehousing loans
to mortgage companies, even though backed by firm take-out commit-
ments, the interest rate may run slightly higher than on large warehousing
loans to
Many commercial banks will not make an uncommitted warehousing
loan without making a standby commitment as well.In such cases the
interest charge on the loan may be no higher than on a committed loan,
but for the standby commitment a fee of fromof 1 per cent to 1 per cent,
in addition to the interest, may be charged, the fee depending on the stand-
by price. Total charges on such loans, which generally run for less than
one year, are thus considerably higher than on committed warehousing
loans.Some banks provide uncommitted interim financing without a
standby, often as special accommodation to favored customers carrying
large balances with them, and at the interest rate on committed loans.
Other banks will provide such financing, however, only at interest charges
of from 4.toof I per cent above the rate on firmly committed loans, the
rate depending on the mortgage company and the standby committer, if
any.
11Apossible fifth type not discussed here is the loan not secured, or secured by
collateral other than mortgages. Such a loan is ordinarily backed by a firm take-out
commitment by an institutional investor arid is otherwise backed by the credit status of a
strong mortgage originator. In any event, as shown in Table 20, the amount of such loans
has accounted only for a very small part of interim credit extended to real estate mortgage
lenders.
12Inthe arrangement between Chase Manhattan Bank and Institutional Securities
Corporation, the interest rate wasper cent on the first $50 million plus a service fee of
18ofI per cent to Chase Manhattan on the additional $200 million for managing the
arrangements with other participating banks (based on "Banks Set to Use Mortgage
Funds," The New York Times, October 7, 1955).
ReportNo. 2 of the House Subcommittee on Housing, p. 10, note.
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From the standpoint of market participants, the advantages of the vari-
ous types of warehousing arrangements are clear and seem to outweigh
possible disadvantages to them. The interim lender earns a good rate of
returrL for a loan secured generally by federally underwritten mortgages
and backed often by a firm take-out commitment of a large institutional
investor. The mortgage originator increases or maintains his volume of
business and shares in the spread (when there is one) between the interest
rate on mortgages held and interim financing charges. The institutional
investor is able to compensate for an overcommitted position or have a
reservoir of mortgages established for immediate investment of funds as
they are received from new savings, life insurance premiums, and mortgage
repayments. There may also be an additional fee earned for outstanding
commitments during the interim financing period. Disadvantages may
arise for the commercial bank if it has to extend a loan or acquire mort-
gages unwillingly when a commitment has proved less firm than expected.
The mortgage originator or investor may also be at a disadvantage if mort-
gages are acquired at less favorable prices than expected, taking account of
warehouse fees and charges.
From the standpoint of broader effects on market processes, warehousing
arrangements may be either salutary or detrimental depending on the type
of transaction and on market conditions. There is little question that the
regular short-term interim financing loan, an integral part of the real
estate financing process for years, serves a useful purpose in bridging the
gap between loan closing and ultimate sale or delivery of the mortgage to a
permanent investor. The question is whether the distinctive postwar inno-
vations discussed above have constituted an appropriate use of bank credit.
In th:s connection, the discussion on standby commitments in the preceding
section is appropriate, since both techniques were developed largely to
provide a flow or reservoir of mortgage credit during periods of capital
stringency.
In brief, the advantages of the new warehousing techniques are that
they may permit mortgage originators to operate with flexibility and may
enable institutional investors to plan and carry Out long-range mortgage
investment programs. Used to excess, however, or during periods of ex-
tended capital market tightness, warehousing may tend to stimulate invest-
ment in construction and real estate beyond available flows of savings, with
consequent later destabilizing effects on real estate markets. Warehousing
not hacked by firm take-out commitments, moreover, may lead to an
excess of'mortgages over funds available from permanent investors, with a
consequent depressing result on market prices. Finally, to the extent that
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warehousing is an essential part of long-term forward commitment arrange-
.ments, it may contribute to market excesses. Such imbalance may result
from miscalculations of investing institutions about future availability of
capital funds. Their unwise attempts to build, on those miscalculations,
too large mortgage inventories would add to already large mortgage flows
in one period and reduce available mortgage funds in a future period.'4
DATA ON INTERIM FINANCING
Only recently has information become available on the volume and types
of interim financing credit extended by commercial banks to mortgage
lenders. These data, shown in Tables 20 and 21, confirm two earlier impres-
sions: that mortgage companies are the dominant user of such credits;
and that most interim financing is carried out through direct loans secured
by mortgages rather than through purchase of mortgages under resale
agreement. Data are not available, however, for a classification in the
detail given in the preceding section.
The volume of interim financing credit outstanding more than doubled
between the summers of 1954 and 1955, following a 50 per cent increase in
the four preceding years (Table 20).This sharp expansion resulted in
significant changes in the characteristics of interim financing credits. Com-
mercial bank credit extended to insurance companies increased most
markedly—from less than 2 per cent of the total outstanding in August
]. 954 to nearly 18 per cent a year later. Most of the increase occurred in
purchases of mortgages under resale agreement (type 4 discussed above),
which advanced from 9 to 24 per cent of the total.At the same time.
interim credits extended to mortgage companies, though doubling, de-
clined as a proportion of the total from 89 to 73 per cent, and loans
secured by mortgages dropped from 85 to 70 per cent.
The shifts in the types of warehousing credits outstanding largely grew
out of the single transaction of $350 million between the Prudential Insur-
ance Company and the Irving Trust Company syndicate. As the Pruden-
tial' repurchased their warehoused mortgages during 1956, interim credits
to insurance companies declined sharply from the 1955 level of about 18
per cent to only 9 per cent of the total outstanding in August 1956. Total
credits under repurchase agreement also declined but not so sharply. The
volume of such credit arrangements with mortgage companies remained
14Somefurther discussion of market effects of warehousing may be found in Report
No. 2 of the Subcommittee on I-lousing, pp. 11—13. A private investor's point of view is
expressed by R. B. Patrick (financial vice president, Bankers Life Insurance Company),
"There's Enough Money in Sight for Mortgage Loan Needs," The Mortgage Banker, May
1956, pp. 25—26.
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unchanged, while it increased significantly for other types of borrowers.
All types of interim financing credits extended to other types of borrowers,
in fact, increased during 1956, while those to mortgage and insurance com-
panies showed little change. The proportion of the "other" group rose to
the highest on record. Borrowers in that group included savings and loan
associations, mutual savings banks, builders, and other organizations. Use
of interim bank credits by the financial institutions in the group may have
reflected their need for such credits to finance mortgage purchases under
earlier commitments, including standbys, when the net flow of long-term
saving's was slowing down.
Tables 20 and 21 also indicate the association of particular types of
borrowers with particular types of warehousing credit arrangements.
Mortgage companies typically borrow from commercial banks on the
security of mortgages, although their unsecured borrowing also increased
proportionately.Insurance companies typically use the repurchase
arrangement, although to only a small extent before 1955, when the Pru-
dential loan was closed. Other types of borrowers make use of all arrange-
ments, of which the repurchase type of transaction increased most sharply
since 1954.
The distribution of the unused portion of commercial bank commitments
to purchase mortgage loans from mortgage companies, insurance corn-
and other borrowers—or make loans to them—is quite similar to
the distribution of warehousing credits outstanding among these borrowers.
Included in these unused commitments, which declined from $1.3 to $1.1
billion between the summers of 1955 and 1956, are standbys. There is no
way of determining what proportion they constitute of the total unused
bank commitments. Some students have interpreted these data as consist-
ing entirely of standby commitments, but that cannot be correct because
the figures cover unused warehousing credits (including regular bank lines
of credit) as well. It cannot be correct even if standbys are regarded as the
same thing as "uncommitted warehousing," because the category includes
all types of unused warehousing credits.
relative importance of interim credits in total real estate finance
varieE with conditions in the financial markets. That importance is diffi-
cult to measure because suitable data are lacking. The most meaningful
comparison probably is between the gross volume of interim financing and
the gross volume of mortgage lending for home building and purchase.
Estimates may serve to indicate approximate orders of importance. During
1955, for example, the average amount of the various types of warehousing
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TABLE 21
Percentage Distribution of Outstanding Interim Financing Credits Extended by Commercial Banks
to Mortgage Lenders, by Type of Borrower and Type of Loan, Selected Periods, 1954—1956
1956 1955 1954
Nov.14Aug. 8May16Feb.15Nov.16Aug.10Aug.11
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total loans to mortgage lenders 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Type of borrower
Mortgage companies 77.5 77.3 77.7 80.6 72.8 72.8 89.0
Insurance companies 7.5 8.2 9.4 9.1 17.7 17.8 1.8
Other borrowers 15.0 14.5 12.9 10.3 9.5 9.4 9.2
Type of loan
Secured by mortgages 71.6 71.6 71.7 74.8 68.4 69.7 84.9
Purchased under resale
agreement 19.9 19.1 20.5 18.7 24.9 24.0 9.0
Unsecured or secured by other
than mortgages 8.5 9.3 7.8 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.1
Type of borrower and loan
Mortgage companies 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Secured by mortgages 85.6 85.5 85.5 87.2 87.6 88.9 90.0
Purchased under resale
agreement 9.6 9.3 10.2 9.3 9.2 8.8 8.1
Unsecured or secured by
other than mortgages 4.8 5.2 4.3 3.5 3.2 2.3 1.8
Insurance companies 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Secured by mortgages 6.1 7.4 7.9 8.5 7.0 4.4 18.2
Purchased under resale
agreement 89.5 86.0 89.0 89.2 92.3 94.0 63.6
Unsecured or secured by
other than mortgages 4.4 6.6 3.1 2.3 0.7 1.6 18.2
Other borrowers 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Secured by mortgages 31.9 33.5 33.7 37.2 35.5 45.0 47.3
Purchased under resale
agreement 38.4 33.5 32.0 29.0 19.7 9.2 7.3
Unsecured or secured by
other than mortgages29.7 33.0 34.3 33.8 44.7 45.8 45.5
Unused portions of firm Commit-
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0
Mortgage companies 67.5 74.1 75.2 74.0 72.6 69.0 —
Insurancecompanies 12.2 10.3 9.4 10.4 12.3 14.1
Other borrowers 20.4 15.5 15.3 15.6 15.1 16.9
Thble 20.
&Commitmentsto purchase mortgage loans from or make loans to, mortgage lenders.
probably varied within a wide range of from two months to two years, the
largest portion for six months or less. Assuming an average annual turn-
over ratio of 2.0, therefore, total interim financing extended during 1955
would have been on the order of $3 billion.
Total mortgage credit extended for the purchase of new and existing
houses in 1955, according to estimates of the Board of Governors of the
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Federal Reserve System, amounted to $23.5 billion, some $10.2 billion for
new houses and the remainder for old houses.'5 Relating our estimate of
$3 billion for gross interim financing to the estimate of $23.5 billion for
mortgage loans made for new and existing house purchases suggests a
quantitative importance of about one-seventh for interim lending in total
home real estate finance. On the other hand, if, as observations in the
market suggest, warehousing is associated chiefly with financing of new
house building and purchase, the order of importance is increased to well
over one-fourth.
The significance of interim mortgage financing in 1955 becomes even
greater when comparison is made between the volume of new warehousing
and of FHA and VA financing, since conventional mortgage loans are
seldom warehoused. In 1955, the total volume of federally underwritten
mortgage lending was $10.3 billion, $5.9 billion of it for new house pur-
chases. If the whole volume of warehousing is assumed to be used for FHA
and VA financing of new houses, warehousing accounted for approximately
one-half of that volume in 1955. This is probably too high a ratio, for not
all warehousing was used to finance VA or FHA mortgages on new
housing; but it is some indication of the importance of that technique in
the federally underwritten mortgage market. Compared to the total of
all FHA and VA financing, warehousing accounted for about 30 per cent—
still an impressive proportion.Finally, one may consider that the $1.2
billion of unused warehousing commitments outstanding during 1955 was
supporting at least that amount of new construction credit.
While the quantitative significance of interim financing cannot be
measured exactly, it is clear that such commercial bank credit had become
of signal importance in mortgage markets by the end of the postwar decade.
In 1956, the relative significance of warehousing remained about the same
as that just described for 1955. To mortgage companies, in particular,
interimfinancing from commercial banks was an essential factor in their
rapid postwar growth (see Chapter 8).
Primary and Secondary Mortgage Market Characteristics
and Relationships
The complexities of special institutional arrangements and techniques
associated with marketing mortgages have clouded somewhat the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary mortgage markets. The lack of
clarity particularly impedes attempts to separate these markets quan-
titatively in terms of volume, nature of transactions, prices, and costs.
FederalReserve Bulletin, May 1957, p. 369.
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What does seem clear is that distinctions made in the mortgage market—as
evidenced by general terminology and common understanding of partici-
pants—and in the scant statistics that exist are based on somewhat different
interpretations of the terms "primary" and "secondary" than those gener-
ally given by economists or by participants in other sectors of the capital
market.
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
While there are undoubtedly several different acceptable definitions of a
primary capital market, a widely accepted one is a market in which debt or
equity instruments are created in transactions between borrowers or sellers
and initial lenders or buyers. A secondary market, in contrast, is one in
which previously created securities are traded between investors, with or
without the aid of intermediaries. The economic function of a primary
capital market is to bring together seekers of funds and investors at
mutually acceptable prices or interest rates. A secondary market provides
a means for holders of securities in need of funds or for other purposes to
dispose of holdings before maturity and for buyers to acquire financial
instruments. Many investors consider the original acceptability of invest-
ments in terms of their marketability. Even though committed to long-
term loans or investments, investors may find that unforeseen events or
changing programs and policies often make it expedient to obtain funds
through secondary markets.
In terms of that definition and of other characteristics of the mortgage
market discussed below, a secondary market for mortgages scarcely existed
before the advent of federal mortgage insurance in 1934 and guarantee in
1944. Before that the mortgage market consisted in the main of thousands
of local primary markets in which individual borrowers obtained new loans
or renewals directly from lenders on the security of individrial properties.
Each loan was tailored to the specific needs and requirements of borrowers
and lenders. With little or no uniformity or standardization in loan con-
tracts, shifting ownership of mortgages among investors was quite limited
and expensive.It was based necessarily upon detailed examination and
appraisal of property, neighborhood, borrower, and loan terms, and con-
fined to places where the underlying property was located and local inves-
tors familiar with economic conditions.
A major exception to this pattern of market activity is that of the real
estate bond market of the 1920's. In the apartment house and commercial
property real estate boom of that period, investment in real estate securities
became quite fashionable and widespread. To permit and encourage the
participation of many individual investors in one or more mortgages, those
196MARKET TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
debt instruments were broken down into real estate bonds of readily mar-
ketable face amounts, usually $1,000. The bonds, many with the collateral
signatu.re of a so-called mortgage guarantee company, were widely traded
in over-the-counter markets, predominantly in New York and Chicago.
Investors paid too little attention to the underlying properties or the
borrowers, partly because of the so-called guarantee of the bonds and
partly because of their marketability. The subsequent collapse of real
estate values together with the questionable financial practices of many
real estate bond houses and "guarantors" resulted in widespread losses by
real estate bond-holders. The real estate bond disappeared as a wide-
spread financial instrument.'6 The acceptability and marketability of
mortgage loans among investors, therefore, was at a low ebb in the 1930's.
Introduction of federal mortgage insurance through the Federal Housing
Administration in 1934 and of guarantee through the Veterans Adminis-
tration in 1944 imparted to the mortgage instrument a degree of accepta-
bility, uniformity of quality, and standardization of terms unknown before.
The need of the investor for close scrutiny of property and borrower was
by the federal government's acceptance of contingent liability for
fulfihirrient of the mortgage contract.Federally underwritten mortgages
became broadly shiftable among investors, geographic barriers were
sharply reduced, and a national secondary mortgage market began to take
form.
Considerable changes also took place in basic techniques in primary
mortgage markets associated with financing of new houses. The changes
accompanied those taking place in the house building industry generally.
Postwar changes in production and marketing of houses—especially the
large-scale type of operation—and their effects on mortgage markets have
been discussed in several connections. Separate and distinct transactions
between each individual mortgagor and lender, typical of prewar mort-
gage markets, were being replaced by mass mortgage transactions between
builders and lenders on behalf of numerous unknown ultimate mortgagors.
Statisticson real estate mortgage bonds may be found in Raymond W. Goldsmith,
A Stud i'ofSaving, Princeton, 1955, Vol. I, Tables R-41 through R-43, pp.635—637. Among
the many references on the general subject of real estate bonds the following are examples:
Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work,
Personnel, and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committee, Part III, June 3,
1936;Louis S. Posner, "The Lesson of Guaranteed Mortgage Certificates," Harvard
Businecs Review, September 1948, pp. 560—571; Ernest A. Johnson, "Long-term Real
Estate Securities," Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, February 1936, pp. 44—47
(includes figures on issues from Commercial and Financial Chronicle); Commercial and Financial
Chronide, 128 (1929), pp. 316—317; 138 (1934), p. 211;140 (1935), p. 22; Genevieve
Koester, Real Estate Bonds, 1919—1938: Corporate History," Journal of Land
Economics, 1939, pp. 49—58.
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These observations are not to suggest that widespread trading exists in
all types of mortgages on all types of properties or that the primary mort-
gage market is characterized essentially by mass transactions. On the
contrary, there isstill only limited secondary trading in conventional
mortgages, which account for the largest share of all those originated or
outstanding. In the primary mortgage market, furthermore, individual
negotiations between borrowers and lenders are predominant for conven-
tional mortgages on all types of properties, residential and nonresidential.
Federally underwritten mortgages on existing houses are also usually
arranged individually. Mortgage markets by their nature are basically
local, and mortgage contracts still vary widely according to the individual
needs of borrowers, characteristics of underlying properties, and require-
ments of lenders.
Introduction and ultimate broad acceptance of FHA mortgage insur-
ance and VA mortgage guarantee largely eliminated earlier investor
problems of acquiring mortgages outside local areas. Instead, new prob-
lems of market organization and mortgage acquisition for nonlocal
investors arose, as previously described. As large-scale institutional inves-
tors established branch offices or worked through institutions located in
other cities and states (such as real estate and mortgage companies or
commercial banks)market processes and techniquesof mortgage
origination and ultimate investment, already discussed, became more
distinctly separate than ever before.It is from that clear separation of
processes that the distinction between primary and secondary marketing of
mortgages has emerged. Upon understanding of the special trade mean-
ing of the terms "origination" and "purchase" in the mortgage market
hinges our understanding of the meaning of primary and secondary
mortgage markets, of relationships between them, and of such statistics
that exist on those market transactions.
A mortgage origination is considered in the market as a transaction in
which a mortgage loan is made and closed in the name of the originator,
whether or not the action is taken for another investor and regardless of
the ultimate source of funds. An acquisition or purchase, then, is a
transaction in which a mortgage is acquired from an originator, whether
or not the mortgage was originated under a prior agreement for such
purchase. In this framework, three types of transactions may be identified
which would be classified by mortgage market participants as belonging
to the secondary mortgage market:
1. Transactions in which mortgages are purchased by investors from
originators on the basis of prior allocations of funds or firm commitments
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2. Transactions in which mortgages are purchased by investors from
without prior allocations or commitments, but with the
clear intent in origination to sell rather than to hold the completed
mortgage
3. Transactions between permanent investors in seasoned mortgages
acquired originally by the seller as long-term investments
Of the three types of transactions considered from the standpoint of the
economic concept and functions of primary and secondary markets, only
the third type might properly be classified as a true secondary market
transaction. The first type seems clearly to belong in the primary market
classification as a special technique of mortgage acquisition which reflects
the organization of mortgage markets and operations of out-of-state
mortgage investors.
For the second type of transaction, appropriate classification is less clear.
The "open" market in which purchases of this type are made at quoted
prices, in contrast to the first type in which purchases are made in a
"closed" market on the basis of prior arrangements, may be thought of as a
secondary market. On the other hand, mortgages so purchased are origi-
nated for the express purpose of sale to a permanent investor, and such
transactions are not unlike those in the corporate securities market where
new issues are underwritten by investment bankers and offered for sale in
the open market to final investors. The techniques, timing, and services
performed by respective "originators" in the mortgage and corporate
securities markets are, to be sure, vastly different, but the ultimate trans-
actions seem parallel in nature. In transactions defined in 1 and 2 above,
the mortgage originator may retain ownership of a mortgage for several
months after completion under warehousing arrangements before "selling"
to a permanent investor. Where the intent to sell is clear from the begin-
ning, however, especially under prior commitment, extended ownership
before sale does not necessarily change the basic nature of the transaction
from a primary to a secondary one.
The suggestion here is that a basic criterion for distinguishing between
"true" and "pseudo-secondary" and "quasi-secondary" market trans-
actions is the intent and purpose of the seller (indicated partly by the
nature of his business) in originating the loan in the first instance. By that
criterion, the type 1 transaction may be thought of as a pseudo-secondary
market transaction; type 2 as a quasi-secondary market transaction; and
type 3 as a true secondary market transaction.
Perhaps a more colorful distinction between types of secondary market
transactions is that derived from discussion with an officer of a large
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mortgage brokerage firm. He described the secondary mortgage market as
consisting of two basic types of transactions: "nepotism loans" controlled
by the large life insurance companies and savings banks on the basis of
prior allocations of funds and commitments (type 1 above); and loans
purchased in the "open wholesale market" created by originators without
prior allocation (types 2 and 3 above). A few others representing large
mortgage firms regarded the basic type of secondary mortgage market
transaction as consisting of loans acquired in the open market without
prior allocation or commitment. Those intermediary mortgage dealers
were thus in agreement that a mortgage purchase or sale without arrange-
ment before origination was a true secondary market transaction. They
did not make the distinction suggested in this study between transaction
types 2 and 3.
Just as only one type of transaction clearly fits our definition of a true
secondary market, so there is only one equivocal primary market type of
mortgage loan transaction.It is the loan made directly by a permanent
lender to a borrower for his own portfolio. The bulk of savings and loan
association mortgage activity, for example, falls into this category. Most
life insurance company mortgage investment activity, in contrast, is con-
ducted through other originators. It is this distinction between methods of
loan acquisition, suggested earlier, that is used in this study to classify the
few data on primary and secondary market activity.In what follows,
secondary market activity encompasses all three types distinguished here.
STATISTICS ON SECONDARY MARKET ACTIVITY
While no direct data on the volume and characteristics of true secondary
market transfers, as distinct from the pseudo and quasi types, could be
found, some implication may be drawn from the data on transfers of FHA-
insured mortgages. Other data on secondary market activity presented
here are based on information obtained in the Census of Housing, 1950, on
estimates prepared in this study from annual reports of life insurance com-
panies, and from a special survey of savings and loan associations. None of
'the data provide an adequate measure of the volume and character of
secondary market activity but are of interest as indicators of market organi-
zation and techniques of loan acquisition.
Tables 22 and 23 summarize data from the Census of Housing, 1950 on
originations and purchases of mortgages on owner-occupied and rental
residential properties. Of the total amount of owner-occupied mortgages
outstanding around mid-1950, about one-fifth was acquired by portfolio
holders through purchase, compared with one-fourth for rental property
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TABLE 22
Firsi Mortgages Originated and Purchased on Owner-Occupied Properties,






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AMOUNTS (millions of dollars)
Total 32,6916,8483,2008,7975,957 421 968 5,475 1,025
Originated 25,9946,0032,4668,3753,274 323 4,743 815
Purchased 6,697 845 734 4222,683 98 968 732 210
Conventional18,9392,8261,6576,097 1,980 115 — 5,470 792
Originateci16,8752,684 1,3965,826 1,440 93 4,740 696
Purchased2,064 142 261 271 540 22 — 730 96
FHA-insurcc6,603 1,986 683 6012,854 194 152 — 133
Originated3,9331,476 341 555 1,367 135 — — 63
Purchased2,670 510 342 46 1,487 59 152 — 70
VA-guaranteed 7,1492,036 8592,0991,124 113 816 4 98
Originated5,1861,843 728 1,995 467 96 — 3 55
Purchased 1,963 193 131 104 657 17 816 1 43
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Originated 79.5 87.7 77.0 95.2 55.0 76.7 0.0 86.6 79.5
Purchased 20.5 12.3 23.0 4.8 45.023.3 100.0 13.4 20.5
Convention2.l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 — 100.0 100.0
Originated 89.1 95.0 84.2 95.6 72.7 80.9 — 86.7 87.9
Purchased 10.9 5.0 15.8 4.4 27.3 19.1 — 13.3 12.1
FHA-insured 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 — 100.0
Originated 59.6 74.3 49.9 92.3 48.069.6 0.0 — 47.4
Purchased 40.4 25.7 50.1 7.7 52.030.4 100.0 — 52.6
100.0100.0 100.0100,0 100.0100.0100.0 100.0 100.0
Originated 72.5 90.5 84.7 95.0 41.585.0 0.0 75.0 56.1
Purchasec 27.5 9.5 15.3 5.0 58.5 15.0 100.0 25.0 43.9
SOURCE: Data from Census of Housing, 1950, Vol. 4, Residential Financing, Part 1, United States,
Chapter 2, Table 2, p. 40; Table 4, p. 76; Table 4.a, p. 79; Table 4.b, p. 87, and Table 4.c, p. 89.
mortgages.'7 Wide differences were reported among types of holders and
types of mortgages, however. Among owner-occupied mortgages, two-fifths
of insured by FHA and over one-fourth of those guaranteed by VA
were acquired by purchase compared with only a little over one-tenth of
conventional loans. Of all portfolio holders, life insurance companies
acquired the largest proportion of their mortgages, including over one-half
17For the sake of brevity, the terms owner-occupied mortgages and rental property
mortgages will be used here to denote mortgages secured by owner-occupied houses and
by all icinds of rental properties, respectively.
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TABLE 23
SOURCE: Same basic source as Table 22; Chapter 5, Table 2, P. 348;
p. 393; Table 4.b, p. 395; Table 4.c, p. 397.
Table 4, p. 389; Table 4.a.
of their FHA and VA loans, by purchase rather than origination. Savings
and loan associations acquired only a very small proportion of all mortgage
holdings through purchase. Except for FHA loans, savings banks and
commercial banks also acquired a modest amount of their holdings by
purchase rather than origination.
Somewhat different figures, but a similar pattern, characterized activity
in rental mortgages outstanding as of mid-1950. One difference worth
noting in the savings banks data is the much larger proportion of con-
ventional mortgage loans on rental properties than on owner-occupied
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First Mortgages Originated and Purchased on Rental Properties,






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AMOUNTS(millions of dollars)
1,1782,832 145 70
1,111 1,992 98 —




























































































































































































100.0 — 54.5MARKET TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
properties acquired through purchase—one-third compared with less than
one-sixth.While there are no data on the subject, market discussion
suggests that this large proportion of rental property mortgage purchases
consists chiefly of pseudo and quasi purchases from originators scattered
throughout large states where the banks are located or in adjoining
states,'8
The large proportion of mortgages reported as purchased by mortgage
companies (Tables 22 and 23)—surprising in view of the basic nature of
mortgage company operations—is owing in large part to the activities of
Institutional Securities Corporation (ISC), an organization wholly owned
by New York State savings banks. The Corporation has been classified as
a mortgage company by FHA for purposes of statistical reporting, and
apparently also by the Bureau of the Census. ISC purchased a large
volume of FHA-insured mortgages for savings banks accounts before 1950,
when state statutes were amended to permit savings banks to purchase
out-o1-state mortgages on their own. Since 1950 purchases by the Cor-
poration have declined sharply, as indicated by FHA data on mortgage
company purchases (Table 24) and by personal interviews with ISC
officials.
Ordinary mortgage companies on occasion purchase mortgages from
individuals and from other originators to meet demands for mortgages.
Such purchase activity was not uncommon before 1951, when demands for
mortgages by investors were generally larger than the available supply.
While no other except FHA data are available, it seems clear that pur-
chases by mortgage companies have been an insignificant part of their
activities in recent years.
Comprehensive data for the postwar decade on primary and secondary
mortgage market activity are available only for FHA-insured mortgages in
the reports on "originations" and "transfers," which the Federal Housing
Administration receives directly from mortgage lenders. The institution in
whose name the mortgage loan is closed and insured is considered to be the
originator even though the loan is to be transferred immediately to a
permanent investor. Thus, a loan made by a mortgage company for ulti-
mate sale to a life insurance company is reported as both an origination
and sale for the mortgage company and as a purchase for the life insurance
company. Clearly, transfer activity as reported by FHA, summarized in
Tables 24 and 25, includes pseudo and quasi transfers as well as true
transfers. Some inferences about the volume of true secondary market






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.MARKET TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
activity may be drawn from the tables, which are limited to activity in
home mortgages and show face amounts of mortgages.
The total volume of FHA-insured mortgage originations has exceeded
transfers by a substantial margin in each postwar year (Table 24). In most
years, the ratio of transfers to originations has ranged between one-half and
two-thirds, with no steady pattern of growth or decline. Compared with
the face amount of home mortgage loan holdings of all lenders, transfers
have varied between 8 and 16 per cent, the lower percentages prevailing
in more recent years.
Among financial institutions, the pattern of activity is similar to that
suggested by 1950 Census data: insurance companies and savings banks
having a volume of purchases well in excess of originations; savings and
loan associations and commercial banks having a volume of originations
far greater than purchases.Sales of FHA-insured home mortgages by
savings banks, insurance companies, and savings and loan associations were
very small throughout the first postwar decade; indeed, in the case of
savings banks and insurance companies markedly smaller than purchases.
Commercial banks, on the other hand, showed a substantial volume of
sales that in most years was much greater than purchases. As indicated in
Table 25, mortgage companies and commercial banks account for the bulk
of all sales activity, insurance companies and savings banks for the bulk of
all purchases.
In these data on originations, purchases, and sales can we distinguish
between true secondary market activity and pseudo- or quasi-secondary
market activity? An approximation may be attempted on the basis of our
knowledge of the nature of financial institutions' operations in the mort-
gage market. If we assume that sales by mortgage companies (Table 25)
are entirely of the pseudo or quasi type, then the maximum amount of
true FHA mortgage sales would, in most postwar years, amount to less
than one-half of total reported FHA transfers, and in some years to little
more than one-third. A minimum estimate of true mortgage transfer
activity might be approximated also by excluding sales by commercial
banks, on the assumption that those institutions originate FHA-insured
mortgages chiefly for resale to other institutions. Of sales by only the prin-
cipal types of savings institutions—savings banks, savings and loan asso-
ciations, and insurance companies—by the Federal National Mortgage
Association, and by miscellaneous lenders, the minimum volume of true
sales of FHA-insured mortgages would amount to between 12 and 30 per
cent of total sales of those mortgages in the postwar years.
This must be considered the minimum range, of course, because some
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proportion of commercial bank sales represent seasoned mortgages from
portfolios, just as do sales from savings institutions—primarily in the busi-
ness of holding mortgages. Thus, somewhere between the minimum and
maximum figures cited lies an approximation of true secondary market
activity in FHA-insured home mortgages. If we arbitrarily assume one-
half of commercial bank sales to be of seasoned mortgages, then in 1956,
for instance, the volume of true transfers would amount to $352 million,
or about 2 per cent of the face amount of mortgagçs outstanding at the
end of 1956. Even at maximum, the proportion of true transfers to Out-
standings would be less than 5 per cent.
On this basis (eliminating all mortgage company sales and one-half of
commercial bank sales), the volume of true secondary market activity in
home mortgages may have amounted to between 12 and 13
per cent of primary market activity (originations) in 1955 and 1956.It
may have been somewhat more in 1953 and 1954 (averaging around one-
sixth), when originations were considerably smaller and transfers almost
the same as in the later years. In postwar years before 1953 the ratio of
secondary to primary market activity ranged between 13 and 18 per cent,
except in 1950 and 1951 when the ratio reached almost one-fourth,
because of the large proportion of sales by FNMA under the "one-for-one
program."19
Without comprehensive data comparing primary and secondary market
activity in VA and conventional home mortgages, an idea of the pro-
portion of secondary market activity can be gleaned from general know-
ledge of market techniques and from a few data on purchases by savings
banks (Table 15), and life insurance companies (Table 26). It is clear that
VA secondary market activity of all types, quasi and pseudo as well as true
transfers, is at least as large a proportion of primary activity as the pro-
portion of secondary activity in FHA home mortgage markets.It seems
logical to conclude, therefore, considering the similar nature of the instru-
ments, that true secondary market activity in both VA mortgages and FHA
home mortgages is about the same proportion of total market activity.
Nothing is known about the volume of trading in conventional mort-
except that, for obvious reasons, it is considerably smaller than the
trading in federally underwritten mortgages. Data from the Census of
1950 (Table 22) indicate that the percentage of conventional
home mortgages outstanding in mid-1950 acquired by purchase was
between one-third and one-fourth of the percentage of federally under-
written mortgages so acquired. A comparable ratio of true secondary
See Chapter 3 for an explanation of this program.
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market transfers in conventional mortgages to transfers in federally under-
written mortgages suggests that the former account for about 5 per cent,
more or less, of total primary activity in conventional home mortgages.
Primary lending on conventional mortgages accounts for the largest part
of home mortgage lending—between two-thirds and three-fourths in recent
years, on the basis of mortgage recordings. If our estimated percentages
are weighted by these proportions, it would appear that true secondary
market activity in home mortgages of all types represents somewhere
between 7 and 10 per cent of total primary activity, and approximately 2
1:04per cent of the amount of total home mortgage debt outstanding.
Data on market activity in FHA multifamily mortgages are available in
the same detail as for FHA home mortgages. By application of a similar
estimating technique, the ratio of true secondary to primary market
activity for FHA multifamily mortgages seems to be somewhat higher and
more erratic than the ratio for FHA home mortgages. One difference to
be taken into account is that the bulk of originations and sales of FHA
multifamily mortgages is made by commercial banks, not by mortgage
companies. One explanation is that commercial banks make most of the
construction loans on FHA multifamily properties. Such loans are insured
by the Federal Housing Administration (unlike most one- to four-family
construction loans insured by FHA only after the permanent mortgage is
closed) and reported in the statistics as originations. When construction is
completed and the permanent mortgage taken over by the ultimate inves-
tor, the transaction is recorded by FHA as a sale and purchase. In esti-
mating the volume of true secondary market activity in FHA multifamily
mortgages, therefore, it is probably appropriate to eliminate all sales by
commercial banks as well as by mortgage companies. Conventional mort-
gages on multifamily properties are traded about as infrequently as
conventional mortgages on one- to four-family properties.
Concerning some other aspects of secondary market activities of major
types of financial institutions, for an indication of the importance of out-of-
state purchases of mortgages by mutual savings banks, see Chapter 6.
I)ata on the significance of mortgage purchases (quasi and pseudo, and
t:rue) in the activities of life insurance companies and of savings and loan
associations are presented in Tables 26 through 28. Data shown are sub-
ject to an unknown amount of error, but the general order of magnitude
and the comparisons among types of mortgages are undoubtedly accurate
enough to warrant a few broad conclusions.
Total purchases of mortgages by life insurance companies have consti-
tuted something over one-third of their total mortgage acquisitions since
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TABLE 26





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMOUNTS(millions of dollars)
1946 415 310 88 192 30 39 57 9
1947 808 637 120 426 91 56 91 24
1948 1,022 837 445 227 165 111 59 15
1949 894 670 530 65 75 148 66 10
1950 1,713 1,436 620 716 100 175 80 22
1951 1,900 1,557 547 800 210 187 135 21
1952 1,233 987 366 274 347 120 107 19
1953 1,438 1,208 483 359 366 80 128 22
19542,003 1,737 395 1,122 220 92 153 21
1955n.a. n.a. 612 1,474 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONOF TOTAL MORTGAGE
1946 25 40 63 74 8 18 10 5
1947 29 41 59 71 14 22 11 9
1948 30 42 52 62 21 24 10 5
1949 26 37 54 50 11 24 8 3
1950 35 45 51 74 10 30 11 6
1951 37 47 64 62 18 32 13 5
1952 31 42 60 64 26 25 14 5
1953 33 45 65 79 24 23 15 5
1954 37 50 65 81 15 24 14 5
1955n.a. n.a. 65 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SouRcl3 BY COLUMN:
(1, 2, 6, 7, 8) Foryears 1946—1953, unpublished data obtained by the Federal Home
LoanBank Board (FHLBB) in annual surveys of mortgage lending activities of life
insurance companies. Ratios of loans purchased to total acquisitions indicated by these
data were applied to revised figures on acquisitions (FHLBB, Nonfarm Mortgage Investments
ofInsurance Companies, 1955, p. 3) to derive adjusted figures for loans purchased. The
relatioaship between purchases and acquisitions shown by the FHLBB data were checked
for recent years and found to agree closely with information contained in annual state-
ments of ten leading life insurance companies accounting for about one-half of total life
insurance company assets in 1954. The 1954 annual statements were, therefore, used as
the basis for deriving data in 1954, since FHLBB discontinued receiving purchase and
origination figures after 1953.
(3) Derived from unpublished FHA data on face amount of originations and purchases
of life insurance companies (published figures are for all insurance companies). Acquisi-
tions, which percentages shown in this table are based, were derived by applying
to total FHA mortgage acquisitions, as reported by the Institute of Life Insurance, the
ratio of FHA one- to four-family acquisitions to total, as indicated by FHA data.
(4)Calculated by subtracting figures on originations reported by VA from figures on
acquisitions reported by the Institute of Life Insurance.
(5)Col. 2 minus sum of Cols. 3 and 4.
n.a. =notavailable.
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1950, compared with an average of a little over one-fourth in preceding
postwar years (Table 26). The bulk of these purchases has been of one- to
four-family mortgages, mostly insured or guaranteed by the federal
government. Throughout the postwar decade purchases accounted for the
largest proportion of FHA and VA mortgage acquisitions—a proportion
showing, however, erratic fluctuations through the years. The proportion
of conventional home mortgage loans obtained through purchase has been
fairly modest throughout, and larger in the later than earlier years.
TABLE 27
Primary and Secondary Mortgage Market Activity of
Savings and Loan Associations, 1952—1955
(millions of dollars)
Outstanding
(end of year) Originations
Purchases
(during year) Sales
1952 18,396 6,617 151 201
1953 21,962 7,767 289 161
1954 26,193 8,969 463 279
1955 31,584 11,432 508 399
SOuRCE: Based on data for all associations insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation and shown in FHLBB release, "Mortgage Lending Activity of
Savings and Loan Associations," September 1955. Loans originated by insured associ-
ations accounted for from 88 to 92 per cent of loans originated by all associations in
1952—1955, and ratios of transfer activity were assumed to be about the same.
While quantitative evidence is lacking, market observation and dis-
cussion lead one to conclude that these data on mortgage purchases of life
insurance companies reflect chiefly pseudo- and quasi-secondary methods
of loan acquisition, and only in minor part true secondary market trading
in seasoned mortgages. Thus the data reinforce the general impression
that most mortgages on commercial and farm properties in portfolios
of life insurance companies are originated directly by them, rather than
being acquired indirectly through originators, as home mortgages are.
The latter are obtained mainly through mortgage loan correspondents,
usually on the basis of prior commitments.Purchases of seasoned
mortgages from portfolio holders are only occasional, when available
funds exceed earlier expectations and planning. Life insurance companies
rarely sell mortgages from their portfolios.
Data on secondary market activities (defined in the broadest sense) of
savings and loan associations, made available for the first time in 1955,
confirm general knowledge of the insignificance of such activity with
respect to their own mortgage operations. These data, shown in Table 27,
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are somewhat surprising, however, in that the absolute volume of mortgage
purchases by savings and loan associations is quite significant in compari-
son with the volume purchased by life insurance companies and by savings
banks-—both considered to be active participants in secondary markets.
Between 1952 and 1955 mortgage purchases and sales by savings and
loan associations increased significantly but remained a small part of their
total mortgage activity, never exceeding 2 per cent of outstandings or 5 per
cent of acquisitions. The total volume of savings and loan mortgage pur-
chases in thos.e years was nevertheless substantial, about one-fourth of that
of life company purchases and about one-half of that of savings
banks.
Additional evidence on the nature and characteristics of savings and
loan secondary market activity was obtained as part of a survey made in
this study and noted in Chapter 6. The primary purpose of the survey
was to clarify problems associated with gross mortgage lending activity of
savings and loan associations.Supplementary questions on mortgage
purchases and sales, a little known aspect of savings and loan activity,
were included also.Returns from the survey were too small to justify
firm conclusions in quantitative form, but not too small to be used as
guides to characteristics of purchases and of sales activity—also practically
unknown before that. In view of limitations in the data, calculations were
made from survey results in the form of percentage distributions, presented
in Table 28. The figures should be considered primarily as approximate
magnitudes. Some encouragement about the validity of the data, how-
ever, may be drawn from a comparison with similar data for all insured
associations. For the latter group, mortgage purchases, as reported by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Table 27), accounted for 3.7 per cent
of originations in 1953, 5.2 per cent in 1954, and 4.4 per cent in
1955.In the survey made for this study, mortgage purchases in those
years represented 3.8, 8.5, and 3.9 per cent, respectively. The difference
is significant only for 1954 and the direction of change between years is
identical.
Of the 58 savings and loan associations responding to the questionnaire,
33 or nearly three-fifths indicated that they had engaged in some pur-
chasing or selling of mortgages during the three years from 1953 through
1955. Among states, California accounted for both the largest number of
associations and largest amount of transfer activity. Of the 11 California
associations reporting in the survey, 9 indicated that they had bought or
sold mortgages.Most other associations reporting secondary market
activity were located in the Midwest and Southwest.
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Moitgage purchases of savings and loan associations are made more
often than not on the basis of prior commitments. They consist principally
of VA loans, and are obtained most frequently from mortgage companies
(Table 28). The conclusion seems fair, therefore, that a large part of savings
TABLE 28
Percentage Distribution of Amounts of Mortgage Purchases and Sales by
Savings and Loan Associations, 1953—1955
Type of Purchase or Sale
Purchase
1953 1954 1955 1953 1954 1955
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Prior commitment
With 52 58 60 3 3 2
Without 48 42 40 97 97 98
Type of mortgage
VA 73 85 73 63 76 66
FHA 16 8 15 7 3 2
Conventional 11 6 13 30 21 32
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SOURCE: Replies of 58 savings and loan associations in survey made in this study.
aIndividualsand the Veterans Administration.
and loan purchase activity is of the pseudo- or quasi-secondary type.
The only private financial institutions, except mortgage companies, from
which a significant proportion of mortgages is purchased are other savings
and loan associations.In 1955, especially, such purchases rose sharply,
perhaps because of the tight position experienced by some as a result of
borrowing restrictions imposed by Federal Home Loan Banks. For those
associations, sale of mortgages from portfolio became necessary in order to
honor outstanding commitments. Purchases from FNMA were especially
important in 1954, when savings and loan associations had more funds
available than investment in private mortgage markets could absorb. The
data indicate that, on occasion, savings and loan associations have pur-
chased mortgages from private individuals and from the Veterans Adminis-
tration. The latter purchases consisted chiefly of direct loans made by VA
to veterans unable to obtain financing from private lenders.
Mortgage sales made by savings and loan associations, in contrast to
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purcaases, were almost entirely without prior commitment. While consist-
ing largely of VA loans, they included a significant proportion of conven-
tiona.l mortgages. Such activity is fundamentally of the true secondary
market variety. Most sales were made to savings banks and life insurance
companies, although most other types of institutions were represented
among the purchasers. The reader is reminded (Chapter 6) that the high
percentage of sales to savings banks shown in the table reflects in the main
the activity of one large California savings and loan association. Perhaps
most surprising in the data on sales is the large proportion of conventional
morigages. That they were sold to all types of financial institutions is the
only information we have on the characteristics of such mortgages. Un-
doubtedly both newly originated and seasoned mortgages were included,
the latter probably increasing proportionately towards the end of 1955
when some savings and loan associations were pressed for funds.
With respect to secondary mortgage market activities, we may recall
that general brokerage business is prohibited for federal savings and loan
associations. The law allows them to sell any type of mortgage loan at any
time so long as total sales in a calendar year do not exceed 20 per cent of
the dollar amount of mortgage loans held at the beginning of the year.
Federal associations may purchase any type of mortgage loan originated
by them. They may purchase federally insured and guaranteed loans (up
to a maximum amount of $35,000) on property located outside of their
regular lending area—usually within a radius of fifty miles from an associ-
ations' home office.2°
MARKETING ORGANIZATION, COSTS, AND PRICES
The institutional framework of primary and secondary mortgage markets,
defined however broadly or narrowly, overlaps both ways. Some insti-
tutions participate more extensively in one market than the other; some
perform more specialized functions than others; but most participate in
both markets to some degree.2'Briefly, the structural organization of
mortgage markets consists of mortgage originators, construction lenders,
interim lenders, brokers, and ultimate investors. Of the functions implied
by these terms only mortgage origination and brokerage are performed by
specialized organizations—mortgage companies and mortgage brokers—
created for those purposes and performing few other functions.Other
2GFormore details on these regulations see Rules and Regulations of the Federal Savings
and Loan System, as amended, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Secs. 145.6—5, 145.6—6,
and 145.11.
21Thefunctions and operating techniques of major market participants were discussed
in Criapter 6 and some aspects of market organization have been touched upon above.
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major types of market participants performat least two or more functions
in the market.
Savings and loan associations, for example, primarily originate mort-
gages directly for ultimate investment, but engage in construction lending
as well. Commercial banks provide construction and interim financing,
originate mortgages for resale to others, and also hold large mortgage port-
folios for investment. Savings banks acquire mortgages for ultimate invest-
ment by direct origination or acquisition through other originators. They
occasionally make construction loans.Life insurance companies are en-
gaged in permanent mortgage lending either through direct origination or
indirect acquisition.
All participate to some extent in the buying and selling of mortgages, as
indicated in the preceding section. There are no specialized instit:utions,
organized markets, or established exchanges through which trading in
mortgages takes place, except the federally organized and sponsored
Federal National Mortgage Association (see the next section). Purchases
and sales of mortgages in the "open market"22 are arranged either directly
by the participants themselves or through mortgage brokerage houses,
which operate also in primary markets. No data on the relative proportions
of direct trading and trading through intermediaries are available. Infor-
mation from interviews suggests that the largest proportion is carried on
through direct negotiation, on the basis of general knowledge of the market
and contacts in it.While many individuals and small organizations are
engaged locally in mortgage brokerage business, only a handful of large-
scale brokers, with principal offices in New York, arrange transactions on a
national scale.
In the secondary mortgage market, marketing costs are difficult to
separate from prices. When funds available for investment exceed the
supply of mortgages, lenders may be willing to pay fees or premiums to
obtain them. When the reverse situation obtains, fees decline or disappear.
The fee is essentially a cost of marketing or a part of the mortgage price.
Marketing costs, in the sense of direct charges for mortgage purchase or
sale, are incurred only when brokers have arranged a transaction. When
transactions are directly negotiated between participants, no marketing
costs are involved.In brokerage transactions, marketing costs to clients
generally range fromtoof1. per cent of the mortgage loan. The smaller
the transaction, the higher the percentage rate and cost.
22The"open market" concept includes quasi- and true secondary transactions as
defined earlier.Pseudo-secondary transactions are excluded because they are based on
prior arrangements and may be considered as occurring in a "closed" market.
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In primary mortgage market transactions, the basis of marketing costs
charged by brokers is the same as in the secondary market. In the primary
market., however, several other charges or fees, which vary with market
conditions and types of services, are levied directly by lenders against
borrowers or builders. A 1 per cent fee is common for the origination of a
permanent mortgage, for a construction loan, or for a firm take-out
commitment. The charges may all be levied and earned by the one lender
involvcd (for example, a savings and loan association may provide the con-
struction loan, take-out commitment, and permanent mortgage financing
in a package transaction). Or they may be charged by several lenders,
when cach provides a specialized service (for example, a commercial bank
may charge the construction loan fee, a mortgage company the mortgage
origination fee, and an insurance company the commitment fee). The
charges, if considered part of marketing costs, raise the cost of primary
mortgage marketing substantially above that of secondary mortgage
marketing.
Perhaps the nearest approach to a specialized institution or organized
trading place in the private secondary mortgage market is provided by the
large-scale mortgage brokerage house (distinct from the mortgage com-
pany, the subject of Chapter 8). One outgrowth of the increasing volume
of secondary market transactions during the postwar decade is the rapid
growth in business of the few national brokerage houses, rather than in any
significant increase in their number. Mortgage brokers have arranged
transactions for most major types of institutions and between them—
savings banks, commercial banks, savings and loan associations, pension
funds, and mortgage companies.Insurance companies, however, have
seldom made use of brokerage services.
While no statistical evidence is at hand, interviews suggest that the
largesi: part of secondary market transactions arranged by brokers is the
quasi rather than true secondary type. One reason is that the over-all
volume of true secondary trading transactions is still relatively small.
Another is that the development and use of the standby commitment
technique in periods of credit stringency has increased the proportion of
mortgages originated without firm take-out commitments and offered
upon completion for sale in the open market. Mortgage originators having
such mortgages available and offering them at standby prices often seek
the services of mortgage brokers to find buyers. Mortgage investors, on the
other hand, unwilling or unable to commit for mortgages months in ad-
vance, may approach brokers to obtain through them mortgages for
immediate delivery.The broker maintains his market for mortgages
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through trade journal and direct mail advertising of mortgage offerings
and investors' specifications.
Lack of data and confusing market terminology make comparison of
primary and secondary mortgage market prices extremely difficult. There
is no way to compare directly the price of an originated mortgage with its
price when sold in the secondary market. Unlike the situation in corporate
or government securities markets, information about specific mortgage
instruments according to borrower or underlying property is not generally
available. Nor is distinction between a new issues market and a secondary
market so clear as it is in those others. A definite distinction is made, how-
ever, between pricing mortgages available for immediate or for future
delivery. Further ambiguity about mortgage prices arises because FHA
and VA loans, with fixed interest rates, are originated and also traded in
terms of discounts or premiums, while conventional loans, with flexible
interest rates, are originated at par on the basis of changing interest rates
but are traded, like FHA and VA mortgages, in terms of discounts or
premiums from par.
For the purpose of price comparison, pseudo- and quasi-secondary market
transactions may be considered equivalent to primary market trans-
actions because they involve newly originated mortgages. Mortgages of
comparable quality (judged so by the market on the basis of underlying
property and location, mortgage terms, type of borrower) will generally
command the same price. This is true whether they are originated directly
by the investor; obtained indirectly through an originator on the basis of a
prior commitment (pseudo-purchase); or obtained for immediate delivery
from an originator without prior commitment (quasi-purchase). The
mortgage with prior commitment will, of course, bear the price agreed
upon at the time the commitment was made. It may be higher or lower
than the market price by the time the mortgage is delivered. Price differ-
entials, which may exist between pseudo- and quasi-type transactions,
reflect differences in timing rather than in nature of transactions. True
secondary market trading in mortgages, on the other hand, may command
a premium over otherwise comparable mortgages because of "seasoning."
Evidence on this point is thin, however, because of the limited number of
transactions and transactors in that market.
Some originators have testified that they have been able to get higher
prices from investors—as much as 1 per cent higher—on mortgages held
for a year or so after completion than on those sold immediately upon
completion. This is attributed to the greater assurance that can be given
the investor about the credit worthiness of the mortgagor, the promptness
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of his payments, the soundness of the underlying property and its location.
Discussion with FNMA officials has also revealed that investors often prefer
to purchase somewhat seasoned mortgages from FNMA's portfolio. Mort-
gages that are too old in the sense that outstanding balances have been
reduced to low levels are undesirable because the return is small compared
with the cost of servicing—the same for small and large mortgages. But
because there is no organized or continuous market for trading in older
mortgages, each transaction is subject to individual negotiation, the price
being influenced by the relative bargaining position of the participants,
among other special considerations. Chief of those determining the level
of mortgage prices in the true secondary market are the general financial
situation and the prevailing prices in the primary mortgage market.
THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
In the American capital markets the existence of a single federally spon-
sored and organized secondary market facility is unique. An analysis of the
nature and characteristics of primary and secondary mortgage markets,
therefore, requires a description and appraisal of the role of the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA). An appraisal of the impact
on postwar mortgage markets of major statutory and administrative
changes in FNMA operations was given in Chapter 3. In this section we
are concerned with the developing history and operations of FNMA from
its pre-Worid War II background and early charters to its latest reorgani-
zation in November 1954.
Background and Development
During its lifetime beginning in 1938, FNMA has been organized under
three separate charters, reflecting changing needs in the mortgage market
and changing philosophies about the nature and scope of federal inter-
vention in this market. The original formation of the Association occurred
against a background of federal efforts to stimulate housing construction,
build:ng materials production, and mortgage investments following the
unprecedented decline the Great Depression. The basic program of
federal mortgage insurance was to be supplemented in part by a program
to acaieve greater liquidity and marketability of institutional mortgage
investments, especially FHA-insured mortgages. To this end, federal
chartering of private national mortgage associations to buy and sell first
mortgages on residential real estate was authorized in 1934 under the
supervision of the Federal Housing Administrator.23
23NationalHousing Act, Title III, enacted June 27, 1934.
217MARKET TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
Initially, to obtain charters, mortgage associations were required to have
paid-in capital of $5 million in cash or government securities. Supplemen-
tary capital to finance operations was to be obtained through issue of notes,
bonds, debentures, or other obligations to the general public. -Amounts
allowed were up to ten times the par value of capital stock but not in excess
of the face value of insured mortgages, cash, and government obligations
owned by an association. The organizations authorized were thus similar
to mortgage banks long popular in Europe.
When no private national mortgage associations were formed under the
original act, a series of liberalizing amendments was enacted over a period
of about three and one-half years, successively reducing capital stock
requirements and increasing borrowing capacity, authorizing direct lend-
ing on some types of FHA-insured mortgages, and exempting associations
from all federal, state, and local taxes.Still not a single private national
mortgage association was organized. Finally, perhaps to demonstrate the
feasibility of such associations, the Reconstruction Fin'ance Corporation
was asked by the President, under authority granted earlier, to organize
and manage a national mortgage association in Washington.
On February 10, 1938, the National Mortgage Association of Washing-
ton was chartered by the Federal. Housing Administrator with an initial
paid-in capital and surplus of $11 million and borrowing capacity limited
to twenty times that. Further, the RFC was prepared if necessary to con-
tribute an additional $40 million to the capital of this and other national
mortgage associations, if formed.The functions of national mortgage
associations were at that time defined as "maintaining an active market
for insured mortgages and a steady flow of mortgage money at relatively
favorable interest rates, and of providing an avenue of investment for in-
dividuals and institutions heretofore unable to benefit directly from the
insured mortgage program."24
On April 5, 1938, the National Mortgage Association of Washington
was named Federal National Mortgage Association, better knowtn sub-
sequently as "Fanny May." While authority for chartering private
national mortgage associations still existed, none were formed. The act of
july 1,1948, providing for the reorganization of FNMA under a new
charter rescinded authorization for them.
The failure to establish a privately owned secondary mortgage market
facility in the 1930's was probably the result of a combination of circum-
stances.For some time following the enactment of the FHA mortgage
24"Openingthe Mortgage Association Field," Insured Mortgage Portfolio, Federal
Housing Administration, p. 3, March 1938.
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insurance program, FHA-insured loans were not readily acceptable to
mortgage lenders. Their provisions for long-term amortization, relatively
high ratios of loan-to-value, and relatively low interest rates were radical
departures from mortgage lending practices then in effect.In 1934 and
1935, home mortgage loans of less than $100 million were insured by FHA,
less than 5 per cent of the two-year total volume of home mortgage loans
made.In 1936 the volume of FHA mortgage insurance increased
substantially but, by 1938, when the last federal attempt was made to
encourage formation of private national mortgage associations, the rate of
expansion had slowed considerably. During the three years 1936—1938,
only about one-sixth of home mortgage lending was insured by FHA
compared with three-tenths in the postwar decade.
Mortgage bankers and investors were reluctant to invest in the capital
stock of untried associations dealing in untried mortgages when real estate
and building activities were depressed. Even if FHA mortgages should
become widely accepted on the market, the outlook for profitable operation
of nalional mortgage associations seemed doubtful. The prospective net
return on invested capital seemed low, judging from likely costs of oper-
ation and borrowing. Then, after establishment of a federally owned
corporation to buy and sell federally underwritten mortgages, there was
little chance that a private mortgage corporation would be organized.25
FNMA, during the first phase of its operations from February 1938 to
July 1948, was limited to the purchase of FHA-insured mortgages and to a
maximum lending capacity of $220 million. Under those limitations and
the impact of World War II, the Association's activities were on a fairly
modest scale, Total purchases during the decade amounted to $318 million
and sales to $166 million. Mortgage repayments and other receipts reduced
FNMA's portfolio to only $4 million by the end of 1947. Practically all
25Threeyears before the National Mortgage Association of Washington (later FNMA)
was established, the RFC Mortgage Company, on March 14, 1935, under authority
granted three months earlier (P.L.1, 74th Congress, Jan. 31, 1935), became a subsidiary
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation "to assist in the reestablishment of a normal
mortgage market." Originally, rather than acting as a secondary market facility, the
company provided direct loans for new construction or refinancing of income properties,
as HOLC was doing in the residential housing area. By 1936, in the absence of national
mortgage associations, the RFC Mortgage Company was authorized to purchase from
original mortgagees certain kinds of FHA-insured mortgages. Similar authority was given
in 1946 to purchase VA-guaranteed mortgages, not yet eligible for purchase by FNMA.
As FNMA became more firmly established and real estate markets strengthened, the RFC
Mortgage Company, no longer needed, dissolved in June 1949.
During its operation the company had purchased over 63,000 FHA-insured loans
($252 million), 24,000 VA-guaranteed loans ($141 million), and had made direct
mortgage loans ($102 million) almost entirely on commercial properties. The company's
portfolio was transferred to RFC in mid-1947. With the dissolution of RFC in mid-1954,
remaining holdings of $64 million were absorbed by FNMA.
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purchases were made during the prewar years when real estate activity
and institutional originations of FHA-insured mortgages were increasing.
Most sales were made after 1942, when war restrictions sharply limited
building activity and the supply of funds to be invested was far greater
than mortgages available in the private market.
First Reorganization, July 1, 1948
Increased capitalization ($21 million), lending capacity (40 times capital
and earned surplus), and broadened authority to purchase and make
commitments to purchase mortgages were given FNMA in its 1948 re-
organization. Rapid increase in activity followed. Four later changes
increased maximum lending capacity to a high of $3,650 million. Several
other statutory and administrative changes over a six-year period alter-
nately expanded and restrained FNMA's activities under its 1948 Charter.26
Developments during that period showed clearly that FNMA was not
serving as a secondary market facility, as that term is ordinarily understood.
Rather, it had become a special support for government sponsored h.ousing
arid mortgage programs, which were not acceptable in private financial
markets. The Association's policy of purchasing FHA and VA mortgages
at par, regardless of market price, built up rather steadily its holdings—
chiefly mortgages least acceptable to private investors. FromJuly 1, 1948
to November 1, 1954 (the date of its latest reorganization) FNMA pur-
chases of mortgages were $4.3 billion and sales only $1.4 billion.Its hold-
ings increased from $50 million at the beginning of the period to $2.4
billion. Most of FNMA's activity was in VA mortgages.
Second Reorganization, November 1, 1954
After 1948, as FNMA was transformed into a primary source of mort-
gage funds, support—both private and government—developed for estab-
lishment of an organization which would operate as a true secondary mort-
gage facility and with limited dependence on federal funds. Under the
Housing Act of 1954, FNMA was again rechartered and was directed to
reorganize its structure into three separate operations providing for:(1) a
secondary market for federally underwritten residential mortgages;(2)
assistance for financing selected types of mortgages originated under special
housing programs; and (3) management and liquidation of mortgages
held or acquired by contracts under its previous charter. For each of these
operations the Association was separately
See Chapter 3 for more detail.
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New Secondary Market Facility
The 1954 mandate from Congress required FNMA to prevent excessive
use of its secondary market facilities, which were to be self supporting.
Accordingly, mortgages were purchased over-the-counter only, at market
prices not exceeding par. A mortgage price schedule was established.
Prices varied according to location and type of property, mortgage terms,
and market conditions. A "purchase and marketing fee" was introduced
of1 per cent of the outstanding loan balance of "readily marketable"
mortgages, 1 per cent for others. The maximum amount of mortgage per
dwelling unit eligible for purchase was increased from $10,000 to $15,000.
Restrictive requirements eliminated were: that mortgages be held for a
minimum period by originators before sale; that purchases be made only
from criginal mortgagees; and that purchases be limited to no more than
one-half of VA mortgage originations by these mortgagees, and to one-
fourth of FHA.
New financing provisions were aimed essentially at ultimate substitution
of private for federal ownership. Initial capital consisted of $21 million of
capital and surplus from the former Association (paid in by the U.S.
Treasury) plus accumulated surplus, reserves, and undistributed earnings
of $72million.Preferred stock—total of the above, $93 million—was
issued to the Treasury by FNMA.27 Sellers of mortgages to FNMA were
required to subscribe to common stock—not less than 3 per cent of the
unpaid principal of mortgages sold. In addition, FNMA could issue (sub-
ject to Treasury approval) debentures up to ten times its capital and sur-
plus, but not in excess of mortgage holdings, cash, and government or
government-guaranteed securities.
Some objections were raised to the restrictive nature of FNMA's new
secondary market facility.But so long as funds for mortgage investment
were readily available in private and secondary mortgage markets inves-
tors made little use of FNMA's facilities and protesting voices were not
loud. As increasing tightness took hold in private credit markets during
late 1955 and however, the policies and operating techniques
adopted to prevent excessive use of FNMA's secondary market facilities
came under increasing pressure. As a result, liberalizing actions were
taken in the late sun1mer and autumn of 1956.
Requirements for subscription to stock by sellers of mortgages to FNMA
were reduced twice from the original 3 per cent to 1 per cent of outstanding
mortgage balances. The Association adopted a private market technique
This Treasury-owned stock is to be gradually retired from the proceeds of the sale of
common stock and debentures, and from retained earnings.
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of combating credit stringency—issuing standby commitments for a period
of one year. As FNMA raised the offering price on standbys to near its
own purchasing price for mortgages, it approached its old policy of sup-
porting primary mortgage markets. By this time, however, FNMA had
achieved greater flexibility in determining mortgage prices under the
Housing Act of 1956, which authorized establishment of prices "within the
range of market prices rather than at the market price."
FNMA's activity under the new secondary market program remained
small for several months. Mortgage funds from private investors were
ample in late 1954 and early 1955, and requirements of the new program
were not yet familiar to the market. As private credit became progressively
tighter in late 1955 and 1956, and investors became better acquainted with
the new operation, purchases of mortgages by FNMA increased rapidly, as
shown in Chart 28. Just as before the 1954 reorganization, the bulk of
FNMA purchases under the secondary market program was of VA
mortgages.
The sharp increase in mortgage purchases during 1956 was due in part
to adoption by FNMA in late January of a "mortgage purchase option
plan," allowing sellers to FNMA to repurchase the same mortgages at the
same prices within nine months. Adoption of that form of warehousing,
already in use in the private market, and, a little later, adoption of the
previously noted standby commitment technique indicated the Associa-
tion's willingness to embrace approved private market techniques to help
ease mortgage credit stringency.
To finance its secondary market operations, FNMA had sold, by Novem-
ber 1956, $300 million of short-term obligations to the public. Through
June 1956, sales of common stock in connection with its mortgage pur-
chases amounted to a little over $7 million, and net income from operations
to $1 million (after federal income tax).Clearly, there was still a long way
to go before the $93 million Treasury-owned stock would be retired and
the secondary market facility be operated under private ownership.
Programs for Special Assistance, Management, and Liquidation
As previously noted, FNMA's new charter provided for two other
separate functions:special assistance for mortgages originated under
certain housing programs; and management and liquidation of the
existing mortgage portfolio.
Under the special assistance program, FNMA is authorized to purchase
or make commitments to purchase such home mortgages as the President
shall decide to be in the public interest. His decision is contingent upon
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"(1) the conditions in the building industry and the national economy and
(2) conditions affecting the home mortgage investment market, generally,
or affecting various types of home mortgages."Mortgages purchased
under the program, at prices to be determined by FNMA, are limited to
CHART 28
SOURCE: Federal National Mortgage Association.
what (while perhaps not at the time acceptable to private institutional
investors) would meet those standards under usual circumstances. Sellers
of such mortgages are required, instead of purchasing FNMA stock, to pay
fees—i of I per cent of the mortgage amount, and 1 per cent for commit-
ments to purchase. The special assistance program is supported entirely
by loansfrom the Treasury. Mortgagesdesignated eligible forspecial
assistance include those on housing in Alaska and Guam, on housing in
223


















0MARKET TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
defense or military programs and for victims of major disasters, on co-
operative housing projects, and on housing built under urban renewal
programs. By the end of 1956, only about $20 million in commitments to
purchase mortgages was outstanding, and less than $1 million in mortgages
had been purchased.
FNMA's function of managing and liquidating its portfolio of mortgages
purchased or committed for before November 1, 1954 ("with a minimum
of adverse affect upon the home mortgage market and a minimum loss to
the Federal Government") is financed by borrowing from the Treasury
and by sale of unguaranteed debentures to private investors. The first
public offering (January 1955) was $570 million of three-year debentures.
These and subsequent obligations are distinct from those issued under the
secondary market program, and proceeds from their sale are for the reduc-
tion of the Association's indebtedness to the Treasury.
FNMA Mortgage Purchases and Sales, by Type of Investor
and by Geographic Area
Comparable data are not available on FNMA sales and purchases of
mortgages by type of financial institution, by geographic area, or separately
for the periods before and since the Association's 1954 reorganization. The
data at hand, however, indicate clearly the dominance of mortgage com-
panies among FNMA's customers. As shown in Table 29, for example,
from 1949 through 1956, mortgage companies comprised three-fourths of
all sellers of mortgages to FNMA.
TABLE 29
Percentage Distribution of Sellers of Mortgages
to FNMA, 1949—1956
Type of Seller Per cent
Mortgage companies 75
Savings and loan associations 12
Banks and trust companies 11
Insurance companies 2
SOURCE: Federal National Mortgage Association.
Mortgage companies were also the largest purchasers of mortgages from
FNMA, as shown in Table 30, but not so dominant as in sales. The
dominant position of mortgage companies as sellers to FNMA is, of course,
consistent with the character of their activities, but, the large volume of
purchases from FNMA needs explanation. Most of those purchases were
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TABLE 30
Number of Purchasers and Amount of Purchases of Mortgages from FNMA,

















Mortgage companies 228 $506$104$403 38 36 21 44
Life insurance
companies 54 355135220 9 25 27 24
Savings and loan
associations 111 149 28120 19 10 6 13
Mutual savings
banks 63 186109 99 11 13 22 8
Commercial banks 104 156 83 73 17 11 16 8
Casualty insurance
companies 6 21 17 4 1 2 3 a
Others 27 50 30 20 5 4 6 2
Total 593 1,423506917 100 100 100100
NoTE: Includes only institutions purchasing 8200,000 or more mortgages during the
spccifled period.
SOURCE: Information in FNMA booklet "Investors Purchasing $200,000 or morc of
FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mortgages from the Association during the period
August 1949 through June 1955."
a Lessthan 0.5 of 1 per cent.
for resale to ultimate investors, and were made between mid-1953 and mid-
1954 under the "one-for-one program"(see Chapter 2) in exchange for
FNMA take-out commitments. The assurance of firm take-out commit-
ments from FNMA enabled mortgage companies to carry on a mortgage
originating business when such commitments were not readily available
from private investors.
Among the main types of financial intermediaries, those purchasing the
largest volume of mortgages from FNMA were also the most active pur-
chasers in private secondary markets—life insurance companies and savings
banks.Savings and loan associations and commercial banks, however,
also accounted for a significant proportion of purchases.Life insurance
companies were the dominant purchaser of both VA and FHA mortgages,
but among other types of institutions there was considerable variation by
type of mortgage.
Relative to their total numbers, only a small proportion of the main
financial intermediaries were users of FNMA's secondary market facilities.
Only 54 life insurance companies (of an approximate 1,000) and only 63
savings banks (of more than 500) bought mortgages from FNMA between
1949 and1956; in sharp contrast, relatively large numbers of mortgage
225MARKET TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
companies used the Association's facilities. To be expected in view of
marked differences in characteristics and asset sizes among types of financial
intermediaries, the group accounting for the largest number of purchasers
did not always account for the largest volume of mortgages purchased
(Table 30).
The geographic distribution of FNMA's secondary market activities is
indicated in Table 31. The data on purchases and sales are not strictly
TABLE 31
Geographic Distribution of FNMA Mortgages Purchases, 1954,
and Sales, 1945—1955




Stale Nov. 1, 1954Distribution State June 1955Distribution
California 453 19 New York 318 22
Texas 280 12 California 111 8
Michigan 249 11 Texas 109 8
Floridaa 140 6 Michigan 107 8
Okiahomab 137 6 Massachusetts 87 6
Total 1,259 53 Totale 732 51
All other states 1,109 47 All other states 691 49
Total 2,368 100 Total 1,423 100
SOURCE: Data from Federal National Mortgage Association.
aAccountedfor 3 per cent of sales.
bAccountedfor 2 per cent of sales.
CThesestates together accounted for less than 0.5 of 1 per cent of purchases.
comparable. Purchase data refer to the location of properties securing
mortgages in the Association's portfolio on the date of its last reorgani-
zation. Sales data refer to the location of purchasers of FNMA-held mort-
gages during the six-year period ending June 1955. Since practically all of
FNMA's mortgage acquisitions were from sellers located in the same states
a.s the property securing the mortgages, the figures may be considered con-
ceptually close enough for valid comparison. And differences in dates and
timing should not invalidate broad comparison.
The concentration of mortgage purchases among five states in the West,
Southwest, and South reflects the postwar real estate building boom and
the shortage of private capital in those rapidly growing regions.Con-
versely, the large volume of sales in the East (New York and Massachusetts),
chiefly to savings banks and life insurance companies, is a reflection of
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excess capital in need of investment outlets. At that time, FNMA was
serving the useful secondary market function of channeling funds from
capital excess to capital short areas. The appearance of three states—
California, Texas, and Michigan—among the most important in sales as
well as in purchases is due mainly to the large volume of sales made to
mortgage companies in those states under the "one-for-one program."
It is likely that without FNMA sales under the program those states
would not have ranked so high in FNMA sales activity. Even including
"one-for-one" sales, however, it is clear that the significance of those three
states as purchasers from FNMA is far less than itis as sellers.The
reverse is true of New York and Massachusetts investors in FNMA-held
mortgages. Because of the nature of their business, and as indicated by
their limited volume of sales to the Association (less thanof 1 per cent
of the total), those institutions were buying for permanent portfolio
investment rather than to assure FNMA's commitment for later mortgage
originations.
Junior Mortgage Financing
An appraisal of the institutional framework of the postwar mortgage market
would not be well rounded without reference to the nature and character
of the market for junior or second mortgage financing. Limited data and
market observation indicate substantially increased use ofjunior mortgages
since World War JJ•28Yet,there is little organized knowledge and no
regularly reported information on the volume, nature, and character of
the junior mortgage market.
Within the scope of this study, it has been possible to determine only in
broad outline the salient features of that market—participants, pricing and
operating techniques, types of mortgages and properties, and relationship
of primary and secondary markets. Our limited knowledge of markets for
junior mortgage financing needs to be expanded and techniques for keeping
abreast of current developments in that field need to be developed. In the
meantime an analysis is offered here based primarily on market interviews
with professional participants located in a few large eastern cities.
SIZE OF THE MARKET
Comprehensive data on the postwar volume of junior mortgage debt
secured by residential—but not other—properties are available only for
28Censusof Housing, 1950, Vol. IV, Residential Financing, Part 1, United States; National
Housing Inventory, 1956, Vol. II, Financing of Owner-Occupied Residential Properties, United
States; Fred E. Case, "The Uses ofJunior Mortgages in Real Estate Financing," Journal
of Finance, March 1955; William N. Kinnard Jr., "Junior Mortgages in Real Estate
A Case Study," Journal of Finance, March 1956.
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1950 and 1956 from the Bureau of the Census. Even for the residential
sector, since data for those two years do not cover the same categories,
estimates are necessary. Estimates, shown in Table 32, indicate that the
total volume of outstanding junior residentia]. mortgage debt nearly tripled
between 1950 and 1956—from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion. The increase
TABLE 32









(2) (3) (4) (5)
(5) ± (4)
(6)
AMOUNT (billions of dollars)
Total 112.1 4.2 3.7 42.9 1.5 3.6
1- to 4-family 99.0 3.2 3.2 35.9 1.2 3.3
Conventional 55.1 3.0 5.5 21.2 0.76 3.6
Federally
43.9 0.2 0.4 14.7 0.43 2.9
Multifamily 13.1 1.0 7.6 7.0 0.35 5.0
Total
NUMBER (thousands of units)
9,443 824 8.7
1- to 4-family 9,172 785 8.6
Conventional 6,588 459 7.0
Federally
underwrittena 2,584 326 12.6
Multifamily 271 39 14.4
SouRcE: For 1950, data were derived from Census of Housing, 1950, Vol. IV, Residential
Financing, Table 2, and pp. 157, 159, 317, 319, 348, 349, 467, 469, 549, 551, 589, 591,
601, 602.
For 1956, data in col. 1 are from Technical Paper 13, Table I, P. 38. Col. 2 figures are
estimates derived on the assumption that the percentage increase between 1950 and 1956
in junior mortgages on the various types of properties bore about the same relationship
to the increase in first mortgages as was the case for owner-occupied one-family properties
shown in Table 33.
aForjunior mortgages, refers to VA only.
was about the same as that for outstanding first mortgage debt. The
824,000 junior mortgages in 1950 had probably expanded to well over
1 million by the end of 1956.
A more meaningful indication of the postwar growth in junior mortgage
financing is seen in developments in the conventional, as distinct from the
federally sector. In 1950, a substantial part of the outstand-
ing volume of residential junior mortgages were VA-guaranteed—nearly
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TABLE 33
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2.1 2.5 27.7 0.9




underwrittena 45.3 0.2 0.4 12.5 0.4 3.2








867 6.8 7,052 622
714 10.3 4,840 322




SOURCE:National Housing Inventory,1956, Volume II, Financing of Owner-Occupied
Residential Properties, 1958, and U.S. Department of Commerce release, "Mortgage Debt
on Owner-Occupied, One Dwelling Unit Properties, United States, 1950 and 1956,"
July 12, 1958.
The total amounts of first and junior mortgages outstanding at the end of 1956 (cols. 1
and 2) were taken from National Housing Inventory, Volume II, p. 3, fn. 1. The breakdown
of these totals between conventional and federally underwritten mortgages was derived by
multiplying the average amounts of loans outstanding by the number of loans outstanding.
aForjunior mortgages, refer to VA only.
one-half those on owner-occupied one-family properties (Table 33), and
over one-third of those on all one- to four-family properties (Table 32).
The VA-guaranteed second mortgages were made in combination with an
FHA-insured first mortgage under a special federal program that was dis-
continued May, 1950. The 50 per cent decline in VA-guaranteed second
mortgages between 1950 and 1956—from $400 million to $200 million—
has obscured somewhat the real nature of the postwar expansion in basic
junior mortgage financing.
The Census Bureau, reporting on financing of owner-occupied one-
family properties in the 1956 national housing inventory, announced that
junior mortgage debt increased more slowly than first mortgage debt
between 1950 and 1956.29 Actually, quite the reverse was true in con-
ventional mortgage markets—the only meaningful sector for junior mort-
gage finance. While the number of conventional first mortgages on owner-
occupied one-family properties increased by little more than 40 per cent
29Bureauof the Census, press release, July 12, 1958.
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between 1950 and 1956, the number of second mortgages more than
doubled. The much faster growth of second mortgages increased their
proportion of the number of outstanding first mortgages from 6.7 to 10.3
per cent (Table 33).Similarly, the amount of second mortgage debt
outstanding on owner-occupied one-family properties nearly quadrupled
between 1950 and 1956—$O.5 billion to $1.9 billion—while the amount
of first mortgages only slightly more than doubled.
The growth of junior mortgages on total one- to four-family properties
was estimated to have paralleled that on owner-occupied one-family pro-
perties. The $3 billion junior mortgage debt outstanding at the end of
1956 was 5.5 per cent of the amount of first mortgage debt compared with
3.6 per cent in 1950 (Table 32). Junior mortgages on large-scale residential
properties were a greater proportion of both number and amount of first
mortgages in 1950 and 1956 than was the case for smaller residential
units.
A comparative look at pre-Worid War I proportions of first and second
mortgage debt may be instructive. In early 1934 outstanding junior mort-
gage debt was 8.7 per cent of the number and 4.4 per cent of the amount of
first mortgages outstanding on owner-occupied properties.3° Those per-
centages were larger than in 1950, on either owner-occupied one-family or
all one- to four-family properties. But by the end of 1956, following a rapid
expansion, conventional junior mortgages were more important relative to
first mortgages than in 1934. The 1956 proportions of second to first mort-
gages could hardly have been so high as they were during the height of the
real estate boom in the l920's, however, when FHA and VA programs
were unknown and low loan-to-value ratio first mortgages were the general
rule.
Without comprehensive data on the volume of junior mortgages out-
standing on nonresidential properties, fragmentary market evidence
suggests that such financing is at least as important as it is in residential
markets. Study of one small local mortgage market (Middletown, Con-
necticut), for instance, suggests that for most years back to 1920 the volume
and relative importance of junior mortgages on nonresidential properties
were substantially greater than on residential properties.31
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF JUNIOR MORTGAGE FINANCING
Findings on the nature and purpose of second mortgages in different parts
of the country suggest a number of different explanations. In a study of
30DavidL. Wilkens, Residential Real Estate, New York, NBER, 1941.
31Kinnard,op. cit.
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the Los Angeles market it was found that most mortgages on owner-
occupied properties were created to finance their purchase.32 In Middle-
town, Connecticut, on the other hand, junior mortgage debt placed on
properties already owned substantially exceeded that incurred for pur-
chase.33 Second mortgages used to finance property purchases in Middle-
town usually involved transfer of funds rather than of credit.In Los
Angeles most second mortgages were "purchase-money" mortgages taken
back by the seller of a property, rather than new money furnished by a
lender. The findings of the present limited investigation suggest that on
owner-occupied properties, at least, most postwar second mortgages were
originated as deferred purchase-money mortgages in connection with real
estatetransfers.The Middletown pattern may represent a rather
specialized case—a small local market isolated from outside sources of
mortgage funds. The pattern in Los Angeles, which parallels that in
eastern cities surveyed in this study, is probably more representative of the
nature of second mortgage market activity as a whole.
In the booming real estate and construction market of the twenties, the
extensive use ofjunior mortgage financing had a rather definite purpose—
to supplement first mortgage loans available to buyers from lenders only at
relatively low loan-to-value ratios. In the post World War II decade, the
needs of buyers changed. Liberalized mortgage credit under federal mort-
gage programs and changed mortgage lending attitudes among private
lenders combined to lessen the need for junior mortgages. As real estate
values rose and equities increased, however, mortgages on existing proper-
ties were lowered relative to values. New buyers often found it necessary
to refinance completely or obtain supplementary credit to finance pur-
chases. Frequently, the existing first mortgage on a property was a long-
term low-interest rate FHA or VA loan.Prospective purchasers found
such mortgages desirable and sellers found they enhanced the value of
their property, especially in periods of tight credit when interest rates were
rising. Transfers of such properties, therefore, were frequently made sub-
ject to (or with assumption of) the existing first mortgage supplemented
with a purchase-money second mortgage taken back by the seller.
With the generally more liberal financing terms for new than for existing
properties, many sellers found that a favorable price for used property
could be obtained only by taking a purchase-money mortgage in lieu of
cash over the primary mortgage. Even for new houses, however, many
builders financing construction under conventional mortgages found it
32Case,op.. cit.
Kinnard, op. cit.
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necessary to take purchase-money second mortgages in order to sell com-
pleted houses. In Los Angeles it was found that during 1952 and 1953, for
example, an increasing number of builders and contractors were listed as
mortgagees in recordings of junior
mortgageshave been commonly created, also, in the
sale of multifamily rental and commercial properties. A large proportion
of second mortgages created in transfers of such properties, however,
represented actual transfers of funds from lender to borrower, rather than
extension of credit from seller to purchaser. Limited information suggests,
also, that the frequency of second mortgages on those properties initiated
for loans not associated with purchase was higher than on small residential
properties.
MARKET PARTICIPANTS
The chief source of credit for second mortgages, whether of the deferred
purchase or money loan type, is the individual or the closely-held private
corporation. The reason is that financial institutions are generally pre-
cluded by law from accepting junior liens on real property, unless they
also hold the first lien. In 1950, individuals and others held about 85 per
cent of the total volume ofjunior mortgage debt outstanding on residential
properties.35 The surveys in Los Angeles and Middletown for later years
indicate the continued dominance of individuals in the market for second
mortgages. If the 1950 Census finding approximated the 1956 situation as
well, then individuals held an estimated $3.6 billion in second mortgages
at the end of 1956. This was about one-fourth of the $14.8 billion in total
mortgages held by individuals at the end of
Many diverse types of individuals and firms maintain varying pro-
fessional interests in junior mortgages and make a market for them. The
interests may be incidental to main activities, sideline investments, or the
primary or sole activity. The chief types of market participants are real
estate brokers, real estate speculators, mortgage, brokers, mortgage traders,
mortgage investors, and investment syndicates under trust arrangements.
Real estate brokers not infrequently have to find a market for purchase-
money mortgages in order to negotiate property sales successfully. Real
estate speculators typically operate by acquiring properties as cheaply as
possible in all-cash transactions, and selling quickly at the highest possible
prices by accepting minimum down payments and purchase-money
Case, op.cit., p. 48.
Census of Housing, 1950, Residential Financing.
Saul B. Kiaman, The Volume of Mortgage Debt in the Postwar Decade, Technical Paper
13, New York, NBER, 1958, Table 1.
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mortgages over a new first mortgage. Usually the speculator sells his
purchase-money mortgages quickly to get cash for continued operations.
Some mortgage brokers and traders limit their activities essentially to
transactions in the market for junior mortgages. While the number of such
operators is unknown, in the markets investigated there seemed to be few
relative to the volume of transactions. Brokers in second mortgages per-
form the same function as brokers in other services or commodities do by
bringing buyers and sellers together for a price. Traders, on the other hand,
operate by actually acquiring second mortgages with their own funds and
reselling generally to individual investors for a profit.Operating tech-
niques of brokers and traders vary as indicated in the next section.
Investors in second mortgages comprise several different types of indi-
viduals and firms. Professional investors acquire mortgages for their own
portfolios, either by purchasing already created purchase-money mort-
gages or lending funds directly on the security of junior property liens.
Investment-minded individuals acquire second mortgages occasionally for
a supplementary income or, if retired, for major income. The investment
syndicate, in which individuals pooi funds to acquire second mortgages, is
usually organized as a corporation by an attorney or accountant who
generally acquires and manages investments under a trust arrangement.
MARKET ORGANIZATION AND TECHNIQUES
The diverse groups of participants play their roles in highly specialized,
widely scattered local markets. Transactions in primary and secondary
markets are closely related, and little organization exists in either market.
Primary transactions are essentially of two types: execution of a purchase-
money mortgage by buyers and sellers of property; actual transfer of funds
to finance purchase or continued ownership of property. The professional
mortgage broker, trader, or investor plays a fundamental role in both
types of transactions; in execution of a purchase-money mortgage, he is
part of the immediate primary transaction; in transfer of funds, he is a
necessary link to secondary sources of funds.
Sources of funds for second mortgages, largely noninstitutional, are
usually not known to prospective borrowers. The services of a mortgage
broker are generally essential to any primary junior mortgage transaction.
He typically maintains a classified file of investor clients obtained chiefly
through advertisements, circular letters, and word-of-mouth.37The
When second mortgage funds are available from relatives or friends, resort to the
professional market is of course not necessary. Kinnard noted in his study that "a con-
siderable number of family or 'friendship' loans" were recorded in Middletown,
Connecticut.
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broker's fee paid by the borrower for placing second mortgages varies with
the amount of loan and between cities. In one large eastern city, typical
fees are 2 per cent for the first $50,000 of loan and 1 per cent for the rest.
For small loans, the percentage charge is much higher to provide a mini-
mum fee, usually set by the broker. A major deterrent in placing "new
money loans," on second mortgages in many states is restrictions on interest
rates allowed under existing usury laws. Maximum interest rates under
those laws vary widely between states, from 6 per cent in Washington, D.C.
and New York, to 10 per cent in Florida and California, and 12 per cent in
Connecticut. In some states corporations may not plead usury, and hence
corporate owners of property—usually large-scale multifamily and com-
mercial—can borrow on second mortgages more easily than individuals
can.38 In states where usury rates are low relative to yields in the open
market, individuals can negotiate direct money loans only by giving to
lenders large discounts through devices that circumvent the intent if not
the letter of the laws.
Because of interest rate limitations that operate in primary market trans-
actions, many brokers and traders and investors confine their activities to
the secondary market. Those transactions involve chiefly purchase-money
mortgages, on which—through legal discounts or bonuses—effective yields
are raised substantially above contract interest rates. The active secondary
market exists because purchase-money mortgages created in primary trans-
actions are often not retained by the individual sellers of property or real
estate speculators. Rather than hold such second mortgages created as
part of real estate purchases, they seek to convert them into immediate
cash through real estate and mortgage brokers, mortgage traders, or
directly through sale to known investors. Ultimate investors are located in
the way already described for the primary market.
Marketing techniques vary widely among professional operators. Brokers
rely either upon circularized notices listing mortgage offerings with details
on prices, outstanding balances, underlying properties, first mortgage
characteristics, and rents and expenses (for income-properties) or upon
attempts to make their offices into organized market places with mortgage
offerings available. Some mortgage traders have adopted programs of
selling second mortgages to individuals under repurchase agreements. The
trader warrants to repurchase, at the request of the investor, any second
mortgage in default for at least forty-five days at the original sale price
88NewYork State's 1956 legislation permitting corporations to interpose a defense of
usury with respect to mortgage credit on one- and two-family houses (General Business
Law 346) has made new second mortgage money loans on such properties more difficult
to obtain.
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minus principal payments received. Such traders interviewed in this study
had capital investment equal to at least 10 per cent of their outstanding
obligations.
Both brokers and traders depend for their supply of second mortgages
upon realtors, builders, and speculators who find it necessary to arrange
junior financing. Recently those groups have increasingly used the advance
commitment technique, basic in the market for first mortgages. The
second mortgage broker or trader, for example, makes an advance commit-
ment (after the usual inspections and approval) to a real estate operator or
builder to buy or find a market for purchase-money second mortgages
created in a real estate transaction.
PRICES AND TERMS OF JUNIOR MORTGAGES
Commonly, a second mortgage transaction is made at a specified contract
interest rate, combined with a discount or "bonus" on the face value of the
note given by the seller or borrower to the investor. The discount is almost
always a part of secondary market transactions.It is also frequently used
in primary markets, where maximum interest rates under usury laws are
low relative to secondary market yields.Occasionally, contract interest
rates truly reflect yield, but evidence on this point is not readily available
in public or other records. That reported rates on second mortgages are
only a little higher than rates on conventional first mortgages is explained
in large part by use of the technique of discounting and by the effects of
usury laws.39
Traded prices of second mortgages vary widely between and within local
markets. Many characteristics of second mortgage markets contribute to
varying prices for mortgages of similar quality: their local character, the
limited organized outlets and investors, and the lack of knowledge of one-
time participants seeking to sell purchase-money mortgages. Varying
prices are also attributable to the imperfect nature of the market and to the
varying quality of the "paper." Quality of so imperfect a product is often
a matter of individual judgment. Professional investors, however, generally
look to the same set of criteria in establishing prices for second mortgages.
The more important are: location of property; type and characteristics of
property; borrower's credit worthiness; terms of first and second mort-
gages—regular payments to principal, length of loan, and interest rate;
amount of equity in property; amount of second mortgage note; age of
second mortgage—new or seasoned.
CompareTables 7 and B of Census of Housing, 1950, Residential Financing.
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The location of the property securing a second mortgage is of obvious
importance because of the variation in state foreclosure laws. It is especially
important in judging the quality of a mortgage offered in a market in a
metropolitan area including more than one state.In addition to the
obvious bearing on mortgage quality of the kind and condition of the
property, higher rating is usual for second mortgages on income properties.
Owners are often corporations with favorable credit ratings—essential for
marketing a second mortgage at almost any price. In addition, the value of
such properties can be ascertained in relation to income produced.
The terms of both the first and second mortgages are important in deter-
mining the quality of junior liens. The terms of the first have an effect
since inability of the borrower to carry first mortgage paymentsjeopardizes
the security of the second. If the second mortgage is not fully amortized at
maturity, the remaining balance and length of life of the first may be
decisive when the second mortgage becomes due and payable. If the first
mortgage may be easily refinanced to provide funds to pay off the junior
lien, the quality of the second mortgage is enhanced. The terms of the
second mortgage directly affect its quality in the market. The longer the
maturity and the larger the proportion of the loan remaining to be paid off
at maturity, the larger the discount. The higher the contract rate of
interest, the lower the discount.
The amount of equity a second mortgage borrower has in his property is
a major consideration.It is a measure of protection against declines in real
estate values. It is also a measure of the borrower's interest in maintaining
ownership, especially in bad times. The amount of the second mortgage
note sometimes influences the rate of discount, because small notes at
rates equal to rates on larger ones are not acceptable to investors when
each involves equal quality and servicing. A seasoned mortgage that
has proved its soundness will command a higher price than one recently
created.
The wide range of quality factors and other market imperfections in the
second mortgage market lead to wide variation in prices and yields.
Yields, as noted earlier, are a function of the contract interest rate,
discount, and maturity. Limited observations indicated that, in late 1956,
with contract interest rates between 5 and 8 per cent, discounts on second
mortgages secured by owner-occupied properties ranged from 2 to 6 per
cent per year of remaining maturity and on those secured by income
properties betweenand 4 per cent per year.Within the range of
typical maturities this means that total discounts ran from a low of 6 to 9
per cent to a high of 40 to 50 per cent, resulting in yields to investors of
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from 8 to 25 per cent. Yields in the 10 to 15 per cent range seemed quite
common in secondary markets investigated.40 The high yields are due,
in addition to unusual risks, to conditions prevailing in the second mort-
gage market:imperfect knowledge of the market; limited sources of
funds; borrowers' need for credit not available from financial institutions;
and the willingness of sellers, able to obtain inflated prices for properties
on the basis of purchase-money mortgages, to discount such mortgages
heavily for cash.
Junior mortgages on most types of property carry maturities ranging
between 3 and 12 years, considerably shorter than maturities of first mort-
gages. The 1950 Census survey figures indicate that the median term on
conventional junior mortgages on owner-occupied properties acquired in
1949 and 1950 was 8 years, compared with 11 years on conventional first
mortgages. Only one-eighth of conventional junior mortgages were written
for maturities of 15 years or more, compared with over one-fourth on con-
ventional first mortgages. The difference between terms on the two types
of conventional mortgages was somewhat narrower on rental properties.
Apparently, since 1950 maturities on junior mortgages have shown little
change, while maturities on conventional first mortgages have lengthened
somewhat.
Required amortization on junior mortgages increased markedly between
1950 and 1956, just as it had for first mortgages. Census data show that
regular payments on principal were called for on 82 per cent of conven-
tional second mortgages outstanding on owner-occupied one-family houses
at the end of 1956, compared with 70 per cent in 1950. Comparable figures
for conventional first mortgages were 91 and 78 per cent respectively.4' A
smaller proportion of rental property mortgages—firsts and seconds—are
regularly amortized.
Limited evidence obtained in this study suggests that partial amortiza-
tion of second mortgages on both residential and nonresidential properties
is at least as common as full amortization. Some brokers and traders found
that junior mortgages requiring partial amortization only, with payment
in full at the end of a relatively short term (3 to 5 years), were more market-
able than those requiring full amortization in a relatively long period (8 to
11 years). Investors preferred to commit funds for short-term mortgages
with opportunity to renew or liquidate loans at the end of the contract
period. Other professional investors, however, characterized the partially
Inthe 1953 survey of Los Angeles mortgage brokers, Case reported discounts varying
from 20 to 50 per cent.
4'NationalHousing Inventory, 1956, p. 4.
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amortized junior mortgage as the contract with "a happy hope" clause,
and avoided it. The larger the "balloon payment" required at termination,
the stronger the faith needed that the contract would be fulfilled in the
stated period. These investors preferred to put their funds in the more
realistic longer-term fully amortized mortgages.
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